What Reflective Endorsement Cannot Do1
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
Abstract:
In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates in meta-ethics and in the philosophy of mind might be more closely intertwined than philosophers in either area would like to believe. Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | will | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...celebrated knowledge argument i ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for ...
...such an agent i argue will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot ...
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| 1 | agent | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...i ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time ...
...for the first time such an agent i argue will gain new ...
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| 2 | knowledge | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...is inpired by frank jackson s celebrated knowledge argument i ask what will happen ...
...i argue will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain this argument ...
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| 3 | reason | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...new argument against internalist theories of practical reason my argument is inpired by frank ...
...other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value i end by suggesting ...
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| 4 | practical | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason my argument is inpired by ...
...for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value i end by ...
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| 5 | new | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... in this paper i present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason ...
...agent i argue will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain ...
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| 6 | theories | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...i present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason my argument is ...
...similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value i ...
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| 7 | meta | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...end by suggesting that some debates in meta ethics and in the philosophy of mind ...
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| 8 | ethics | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...by suggesting that some debates in meta ethics and in the philosophy of mind might ...
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| 9 | debates | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... i end by suggesting that some debates in meta ethics and in the philosophy ...
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The Subtraction Argument for the Possibility of Free Mass
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Biodiversity and All That Jazz
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
Abstract:
This article considers several of the most famous arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species, and finds them all wanting. The most promising argument for preserving all varieties of species might seem to be an aesthetic one. Unfortunately, the suggestion that the moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the moral basis for the preservation of a work of art seems to presume (what are now widely regarded as) erroneous conceptualizations of "species". The article concludes by arguing that more promising approaches to how "species" ought to be conceptualized suggest that the preservation of species should be construed as of far greater aesthetic importance than is suggested by focusing upon the preservation of any single work of art. Hence, if we have a moral obligation to preserve a single artwork, then we have a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often been presumed. Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | species | 7 |
| Excerpts:
...being under a moral obligation to preserve species and finds them all wanting ...
...promising argument for preserving all varieties of species might seem to be an aesthetic one ...
...the moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the ...
...regarded as erroneous conceptualizations of species the article concludes by arguing ...
...that more promising approaches to how species ought to be conceptualized suggest that ...
...be conceptualized suggest that the preservation of species should be construed as of far greater ...
...a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often been presumed ...
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| 1 | moral | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...famous arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species and finds ...
... unfortunately the suggestion that the moral basis for the preservation of species should ...
...should be construed as similar to the moral basis for the preservation of a work ...
... hence if we have a moral obligation to preserve a single artwork ...
... then we have a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often ...
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| 2 | preservation | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...suggestion that the moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar ...
...similar to the moral basis for the preservation of a work of art seems to ...
...ought to be conceptualized suggest that the preservation of species should be construed as of ...
...than is suggested by focusing upon the preservation of any single work of art ...
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| 3 | obligation | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species and finds them ...
...hence if we have a moral obligation to preserve a single artwork then ...
...then we have a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often been ...
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| 4 | preserve | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...our being under a moral obligation to preserve species and finds them all wanting ...
...if we have a moral obligation to preserve a single artwork then we have ...
...have a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often been presumed ...
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| 5 | promising | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...finds them all wanting the most promising argument for preserving all varieties of species ...
...the article concludes by arguing that more promising approaches to how species ought ...
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| 6 | article | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... this article considers several of the most famous arguments ...
...conceptualizations of species the article concludes by arguing that more promising approaches ...
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| 7 | construed | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the moral basis for ...
...that the preservation of species should be construed as of far greater aesthetic importance than ...
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| 8 | should | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the moral ...
...conceptualized suggest that the preservation of species should be construed as of far greater aesthetic ...
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| 9 | aesthetic | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...of species might seem to be an aesthetic one unfortunately the suggestion that ...
...should be construed as of far greater aesthetic importance than is suggested by focusing upon ...
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Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn't (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude. Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | introspection | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...section 2 presumes such access hence introspection is here divided into two categories ...
...is here divided into two categories introspection of propositional attitude events on the ...
... on the one hand and introspection of broadly perceptual events on the ...
...presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result section ...
...is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection in respect of at least two ...
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| 1 | section | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...the contrary the model presented in section 2 presumes such access hence introspection ...
...and decisions at least section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions ...
...outlines the scope of the argument section 2 presents and motivates the general model ...
...introspection that predicts a divided result section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion ...
...judgments and decisions aren t introspectable section 4 then replies to a number of ...
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| 2 | decisions | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions it won t challenge the existence ...
...not in the case of judgments and decisions at least section 1 ...
...evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren t introspectable section 4 then ...
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| 3 | t | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...to judgments and decisions it won t challenge the existence of introspective access to ...
...exists while arguing that the former doesn t or not in the case of ...
...the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren t introspectable section 4 then replies to ...
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| 4 | judgments | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions it won t challenge ...
... or not in the case of judgments and decisions at least ...
...provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren t introspectable section ...
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| 5 | access | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions it won ...
...won t challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states nor ...
...model presented in section 2 presumes such access hence introspection is here divided into ...
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| 6 | divided | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...such access hence introspection is here divided into two categories introspection of propositional ...
...general model of introspection that predicts a divided result section 3 provides independent evidence ...
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| 7 | attitude | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...into two categories introspection of propositional attitude events on the one hand ...
...at least two core categories of propositional attitude ...
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| 8 | perceptual | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states nor to emotional ...
...one hand and introspection of broadly perceptual events on the other i ...
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| 9 | least | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...case of judgments and decisions at least section 1 makes some preliminary ...
...about introspection in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude ...
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Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
Abstract:
I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the self-ascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible. Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | ascription | 9 |
| Excerpts:
... i consider whether the self ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless ...
...craig for the conclusion that the self ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed ...
...claim that how one formulates the self ascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether ...
...whether one takes the subject of self ascription to be a momentary person stage or ...
...provide two different formulations of the self ascription account of tensed belief one that ...
...persons i argue that a self ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects ...
...enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self ascription of relations rather than properties i ...
...whether one takes the subject of self ascription to be a momentary person stage or ...
...or an enduring person the self ascription theory provides a plausible b theoretic account ...
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| 1 | self | 9 |
| Excerpts:
... i consider whether the self ascription theory can succeed in providing a ...
...lane craig for the conclusion that the self ascription account of tensed belief entails a ...
...i claim that how one formulates the self ascription account of tensed belief depends upon ...
...upon whether one takes the subject of self ascription to be a momentary person stage ...
...i provide two different formulations of the self ascription account of tensed belief one ...
...of persons i argue that a self ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring ...
...for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self ascription of relations rather than properties ...
...that whether one takes the subject of self ascription to be a momentary person stage ...
...stage or an enduring person the self ascription theory provides a plausible b theoretic ...
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| 2 | tensed | 7 |
| Excerpts:
...tenseless b theoretic account of tensed belief and timely action i evaluate ...
...conclusion that the self ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory a ...
...ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory a theory of time ...
...one formulates the self ascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the ...
...formulations of the self ascription account of tensed belief one that is compatible with ...
...argue that a self ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves ...
...a plausible b theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible ...
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| 3 | belief | 5 |
| Excerpts:
... b theoretic account of tensed belief and timely action i evaluate an ...
...that the self ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory a theory ...
...formulates the self ascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject ...
...of the self ascription account of tensed belief one that is compatible with a ...
...plausible b theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible ...
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| 4 | person | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...of self ascription to be a momentary person stage or an enduring person i ...
...a momentary person stage or an enduring person i provide two different formulations of ...
...of self ascription to be a momentary person stage or an enduring person the ...
...a momentary person stage or an enduring person the self ascription theory provides a ...
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| 5 | theory | 4 |
| Excerpts:
... i consider whether the self ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless ...
...account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory a theory of time ...
...belief entails a tensed theory a theory of time i claim that ...
...an enduring person the self ascription theory provides a plausible b theoretic account of ...
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| 6 | whether | 3 |
| Excerpts:
... i consider whether the self ascription theory can succeed in ...
...ascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of self ascription ...
...rather than properties i argue that whether one takes the subject of self ascription ...
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| 7 | enduring | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...be a momentary person stage or an enduring person i provide two different formulations ...
...self ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self ascription ...
...be a momentary person stage or an enduring person the self ascription theory provides ...
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| 8 | momentary | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...subject of self ascription to be a momentary person stage or an enduring person ...
...subject of self ascription to be a momentary person stage or an enduring person ...
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| 9 | takes | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of self ascription to be ...
...properties i argue that whether one takes the subject of self ascription to be ...
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Good and Good For You: An Affect Theory of Happiness1
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Self-Knowledge and Rationality
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view. Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | intentional | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...a constitutive relation between an agent s intentional states and her judgments about those intentional ...
...intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states this constitutive relation is said ...
...such a constitutive relation between first order intentional states and the second order judgments about ...
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| 1 | states | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...constitutive relation between an agent s intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states ...
...states and her judgments about those intentional states this constitutive relation is said to ...
...a constitutive relation between first order intentional states and the second order judgments about them ...
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| 2 | constitutive | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...self knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent s intentional states ...
...judgments about those intentional states this constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue ...
...self knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first order intentional states and ...
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| 3 | relation | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent s intentional states and ...
...about those intentional states this constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of ...
...knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first order intentional states and the ...
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| 4 | order | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...being such a constitutive relation between first order intentional states and the second order judgments ...
...first order intentional states and the second order judgments about them recognition of this ...
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| 5 | judgments | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...an agent s intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states this constitutive ...
...order intentional states and the second order judgments about them recognition of this fact ...
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| 6 | knowledge | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...account for the special authority of self knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation ...
...two ways in which we have self knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation ...
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| 7 | self | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...to account for the special authority of self knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive ...
...are two ways in which we have self knowledge without there being such a constitutive ...
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| 8 | recognition | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...the second order judgments about them recognition of this fact thus represents a significant ...
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| 9 | them | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...states and the second order judgments about them recognition of this fact thus represents ...
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How to be a Normative Expressivist1
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief. Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | normative | 8 |
| Excerpts:
... expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro ...
...make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that ...
...that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of ...
...not merely as an expression of a normative stance but as an expression of ...
...is true if and only if that normative stance is correct although this position ...
...although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism it does full justice to ...
...thesis that at bottom a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than ...
...bottom a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief ...
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| 1 | stance | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...merely as an expression of a normative stance but as an expression of the ...
...true if and only if that normative stance is correct although this position has ...
... a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief ...
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| 2 | assertion | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a ...
...that at bottom a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a ...
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| 3 | correct | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect and it can answer ...
...and only if that normative stance is correct although this position has superficial similarities ...
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| 4 | treating | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes ...
...the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as ...
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| 5 | expression | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance but as ...
...a normative stance but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that ...
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| 6 | realism | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...this position has superficial similarities to normative realism it does full justice to the ...
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| 7 | does | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...superficial similarities to normative realism it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis ...
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| 8 | although | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...if that normative stance is correct although this position has superficial similarities to normative ...
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| 9 | position | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...normative stance is correct although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism ...
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Introspective Availability1
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Precis of My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Determinism and Our Self-Conception
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Comments on John Fischer's My Way
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Fischer's Reasons: Comments on John Martin Fischer's My Way
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Replies
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- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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Recent Publications
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 04:03:11 America/New_York
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