Philosophical Studies

  A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the
 effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent
 than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt
 on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative
 development of the objection.
 
 
	

  Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character'such displacing devices are called
 monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional
 semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan's formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain monsters. For similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable binding is
 argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic
 theory and content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian thesis that directly
 referential' terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric
 content of their operands, we must distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett 1973; Evans 1979; Stanley 1997), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic shift that differs from the other types, it
 is plausible to think that indexicals'which are standardly treated by means of the assignment function'might undergo the same
 kind of shift.
 
 
	

  In previous work we have defended the deprivation account of death's badness against worries stemming from the Lucretian point
 that prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are deprivations of the same sort. In a recent article in this journal, Fred Feldman
 has offered an insightful critique of our Parfitian strategy for defending the deprivation account of death's badness. Here
 we adjust, clarify, and defend our strategy for reply to Lucretian worries on behalf of the deprivation account.
 
 
	

  This paper addresses the problem of upgrading functional information to knowledge. Functional information is defined as syntactically
 well-formed, meaningful and collectively opaque data. Its use in the formal epistemology of information theories is crucial
 to solve the debate on the veridical nature of information, and it represents the companion notion to standard strongly semantic
 information, defined as well-formed, meaningful and true data. The formal framework, on which the definitions are based, uses
 a contextual version of the verificationist principle of truth in order to connect functional to semantic information, avoiding
 Gettierization and decoupling from true informational contents. The upgrade operation from functional information uses the
 machinery of epistemic modalities in order to add data localization and accessibility as its main properties. We show in this
 way the conceptual worthiness of this notion for issues in contemporary epistemology debates, such as the explanation of knowledge
 process acquisition from information retrieval systems, and open data repositories.
 
 
	

  Intellectualism is the doctrine that knowing how to do something consists in knowing that something is the case. Drawing on
 contemporary linguistic theories of indirect interrogatives, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have recently revived intellectualism,
 proposing to interpret a sentence of the form ˜DP know how to VP' as ascribing to DP knowledge of a certain way w of VPing that they could VP in w. In order to preserve knowledge-how's connection to action and thus avoid an overgeneration problem, they add that this knowledge
 must be had under a practical' mode of presentation of w. I argue that there can be non-knowledgeable true beliefs under a practical mode of presentation and that some such beliefs
 would nevertheless be sufficient to establish knowledge-how's characteristic connection to action, and thus count as knowledge-how.
 If so, Stanley and Williamson's account is faced with a serious undergeneration problem. Moreover, the structural features
 on which the argument relies make it likely to present a quite general challenge for intellectualist strategies.
 
 
	

  The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation
 is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the
 old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical
 properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities,
 sensible intuitions represent objectively in the sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner.
 The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative
 view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content.
 
 
	

  In his 2009 article Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,' Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal
 consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel's argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument
 for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel's argument in detail and show that it is
 unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel's argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation
 from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences
 to the claim that all experiences are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences. This inference is inadequately
 defended, for the explanandum may also be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation. Second, contra Kriegel, I argue
 that phenomenological investigation does not support the thesis that we are always peripherally aware of our experiences.
 Instead, it delivers no verdict on this thesis. Kriegel's phenomenological mistake may be explained via a highly diluted version
 of the famous transparency thesis about experience.
 
 
	

  In trying to establish the view that there are no non-living macrophysical objects, Trenton Merricks has produced an influential
 argument'the Overdetermination Argument'against the causal efficacy of composite objects. A serious problem for the Overdetermination
 Argument is the ambiguity in the notion of overdetermination that is being employed, which is due to the fact that Merricks
 does not provide any theory of causation to support his claims. Once we adopt a plausible theory of causation, viz. interventionism,
 problems with the Overdetermination will become evident. After laying out the Overdetermination Argument and examining one
 extant objection to it, I will explicate the relevant aspects of an interventionist theory of causation and provide a characterization
 of overdetermination that follows from such an account. From this, I will argue that the Causal Principle that undergirds
 the Overdetermination Argument is false and hence the argument is invalid; and I claim that the only other available characterization
 of overdetermination would render a key premise in the argument false. Thus, the Overdetermination Argument fails to provide
 us with any reason to deny the causal efficacy of macrophysical objects, and therefore provides no reason to doubt their existence.
 
 
	

  Think of the last thing someone did to you to seriously harm or offend you. And now imagine, so far as you can, becoming fully
 aware of the fact that his or her action was the causally inevitable result of a plan set into motion before he or she was
 ever even born, a plan that had no chance of failing. Should you continue to regard him or her as being morally responsible'blameworthy,
 in this case'for what he or she did? Many have thought that, intuitively, you should not. Recently, Alfred Mele has employed
 this line of thought to mount what many have taken to be a powerful argument for incompatibilism: the Zygote Argument'. However,
 in interesting new papers, John Martin Fischer and Stephen Kearns have each independently argued that the Zygote Argument
 fails. As I see it, the criticisms of Fischer and Kearns reveal some important questions about how the argument is meant to
 be'or how it would best be'understood. Once we make a slight (but important) modification to the argument, however, I think
 we will be able to see that the criticisms of Fischer and Kearns do not detract from its substantial force.
 
 
	

  This paper advances a version of physicalism which reconciles the a priori entailment thesis' (APET) with the analytic independence of our phenomenal and physical vocabularies. The APET is the claim
 that, if physicalism is true, the complete truths of physics imply every other truth a priori. If so, cosmic hermeneutics' is possible: a demon having only complete knowledge of physics could deduce every truth about
 the world. Analytic independence is a popular physicalist explanation for the apparent epistemic gaps' between phenomenal
 and physical truths. The two are generally seen as incompatible, since the demon's deductions seem to presuppose analytic
 connections between physical and phenomenal terms. I begin by arguing, in support of the APET, that implications from the
 complete truths of physics to phenomenal truths cannot be a posteriori. Such implications are (according to the physicalist) necessarily true. But they cannot be Kripke-style a posteriori necessities, since (according to the physicalist) the complete truths of physics fix any relevant a posteriori facts about the reference of terms. I then show how the physicalist can turn the tables: the demon can exploit the physical
 fixing of reference to bridge the gap between the vocabularies, by deducing when phenomenal and physical terms co-refer. This
 opens the way for a type-C' physicalism, which accepts in-principle deducibility while still appealing to analytic independence
 to explain why we (who are not demons) find it impossible to see phenomenal-physical connections a priori.
 
 
	

  The first step in responding to the challenge of external world skepticism is to get clear on the structure of the skeptic's
 argument. The most prominent varieties of skeptical arguments either rely on closure principles or underdetermination principles.
 The relationship between these two sorts of arguments is contentious. Some argue that these arguments can independently motivate
 skepticism. Others argue that they are really equivalent. I argue that although these two arguments are distinct, their independence
 is not as obvious as some have thought. The fact that these arguments are not equivalent is important because skeptical arguments
 that appeal to underdetermination principles cannot be refuted by simply denying closure. So, the strategy for responding
 to skepticism offered by Nozick/Dretske does not seem an adequate solution.
 
 
	

  All representationalists maintain that there is a necessary connection between an experience's phenomenal character and intentional
 content; but there is a disagreement amongst representationalists regarding the nature of those intentional contents that
 are necessarily connected to phenomenal character. Russellian representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are
 composed of objects and/or properties, while Fregean representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed
 of modes of presentation of objects and properties. According to Fregean representationalists such as David Chalmers and Brad
 Thompson, the Fregean variety of the view is preferable to the Russellian variety because the former can accommodate purported
 counterexamples involving spectrum inversion without illusion and colour constancy while the latter cannot. I maintain that
 colour constancy poses a special problem for the Fregean theory in that the features of the theory that enable it handle spectrum
 inversion without illusion cannot be extended to handle colour constancy. I consider the two most plausible proposals regarding
 how the Fregean view might be developed in order to handle colour constancy'one of which has recently been defended by Thompson
 (Australas J Philos 87:99“117, 2009)'and argue that neither is adequate. I conclude that Fregean representationalism is no more able to accommodate colour constancy
 than is Russellian representationalism and, as such, ought to be rejected.
 
 
	

  I defend a hard-line reply to Derk Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument. Pereboom accuses compatibilists who take a
 hard-line reply to his manipulation argument of adopting inappropriate initial attitudes towards the cases central to his
 argument. If Pereboom is correct he has shown that a hard-line response is inadequate. Fortunately for the compatibilist,
 Pereboom's list of appropriate initial attitudes is incomplete and at least one of the initial attitudes he leaves out provides
 room for a revised hard-line reply to be successfully mounted against the multiple-case argument.
 
 
	

  In Why the generality problem is everybody's problem,' Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a
 solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an
 acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality
 problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I will
 argue that the examples that Bishop presents pose no such problem for some theories. I will illustrate the exempt theories
 by describing how an evidentialist view can account for the justification in the examples without having any similar problem.
 It will be clear that other views about justification are likewise unaffected by anything like the generality problem.
 
 
	

  Can one gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony? It might seem not, on the grounds that if a piece of testimony is
 unsafe, then any belief based on it in such a way as to make the belief genuinely testimonial is bound itself to be unsafe: the lack of safety must transmit from the testimony to the testimonial belief. If in addition we accept that knowledge requires safety, the result seems to
 be that one cannot gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony. In a pair of recent papers, however, Sanford Goldberg
 has challenged this apparently plausible line of thought. Goldberg presents two examples intended to show that a testimonial
 belief can be safe, even if the testimony on which it is based is unsafe: the lack of safety need not transmit from the testimony to the testimonial belief. In this paper, I question whether Goldberg's examples really do show
 that one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. The problem, I explain, is that both examples appear (for
 different reasons) to be open to objection. Nevertheless, I argue that although Goldberg's examples do not establish his conclusion,
 the conclusion itself is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. I base my argument on an example which differs in structure from Goldberg's
 examples, and I argue that due to this difference, my example avoids the problems which Goldberg's examples face.
 
 
	

  I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any
 new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism
 demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically
 blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism,
 the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections.
 
 
	

  A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose.
 Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an
 account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated.
 An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objections
 to the effect that the account individuates propositions too finely are raised and responses to the objections are provided.
 It is also shown that theories that try to individuate propositions less finely have serious problems.
 
 
	

  According to Stephen Finlay, ˜A ought to X' means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability.
 I show why this theory of ˜ought' is hard to square with a theory of a reason's weight which could explain why ˜A ought to X' logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A
 X-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at the prospects of a theory of weight based on
 expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that ˜A ought to X' logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A
 X-es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims.
 
 
	

  Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain
 them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions
 possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is
 a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows
 scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, powerful language available. On a semantic view, traditional
 notions of multiple realizability are thus very hard to motivate. At best, one must abandon either the idea that multiple
 realizability is an interesting scientific notion, or else admit that multiply realizable properties do not automatically
 block scientific reductions.
 
 
	

  In this paper I present an original and relatively conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the
 theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. I begin by offering my own version
 of the symmetry problem' for wide scope rational requirements, and I show how this problem necessitates the introduction
 of a normative concept other than the traditional notions of reason and requirement. I then sketch a theory of rational commitment, showing how this notion solves the symmetry problem as I've presented it. I also show that the concept of rational commitment is one we already appeal to in common sense discourse, and that it is necessary for vindicating comparative judgments of
 rationality.
 
 
	

  In order to avoid the problems faced by standard realist analyses of the relation' of instantiation, Baxter and, following
 him, Armstrong each analyze the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of their partial identity. I introduce
 two related conceptions of partial identity, one mereological and one non-mereological, both of which require at least one
 of the relata of the partial identity relation' to be complex. I then introduce a second non-mereological conception of partial
 identity, which allows for both relata to be simple. I take these three conceptions to exhaust the plausible ways of construing
 two entities as being partially identical. I then argue that there is no analysis (including those offered by Baxter and Armstrong)
 of a universal and a particular as being partially identical consistent with any of these three conceptions that (i) is coherent,
 (ii) is consistently realist, (iii) does not lead to absurd consequences, and (iv) offers a solution' to the problem of instantiation
 that avoids the problems with the other standard realist responses. In so arguing, I offer a criticism of the analysis of
 instantiation as partial identity that is independent of the standard criticism that it entails the necessity of predication.
 
 
	

  A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367“386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals.
 In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365“375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference
 patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer's argument, identify an implicit presupposition
 which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic
 necessitations.
 
 
	

  Robert Stalnaker contrasts two interpretations, semantic and metasemantic, of the two-dimensionalist framework. On the semantic
 interpretation, the primary intension or diagonal proposition associated with an utterance is a semantic value that the utterance
 has in virtue of the actual linguistic meaning of the corresponding sentence, and that primary intension is both what a competent speaker grasps and
 what determines different secondary intensions or horizontal propositions relative to different possible worlds considered
 as actual. The metasemantic interpretation reverses the order of explanation: an utterance has the primary intension it has
 because it yields the secondary intensions it yields relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. In these possible
 worlds, the semantic facts can be different: the metasemantic interpretation is metasemantic in the sense that the secondary
 intensions are determined relative to possible worlds considered as actual given the meanings the expressions
 have
 there. Stalnaker holds a causal picture of the reference of names, according to which names have no meaning over and above their
 unique referent, and therefore maintains that the semantic interpretation is not an option. He thus endorses the metasemantic
 interpretation, while insisting that this interpretation does not, contrary to what he originally thought, yield any account
 of a priori truth and knowledge. My double aim in this paper is to show (i) that the metasemantic interpretation, as sketched
 by Stalnaker, is not compatible with one natural understanding of the causal picture of reference, on which names are rigid
 because they have their original bearers essentially, and (ii) that a third kind of interpretation of the framework is available, the metasyntactic interpretation, which grants that names have their bearers essentially and yields some account of a priori knowledge.
 
 
	

  Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think ˜I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness
 in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue
 that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic
 and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand
 the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two arguments to this effect, drawing on insights from the philosophy
 of language and on structural differences between conceptual and nonconceptual forms of representation. Both arguments rest
 on the intuition that while self-consciousness requires explicit self-representation, nonconceptual content can at best provide
 implicit self-related information. I will conclude that in order to explain the emergence of self-conscious thought out of
 more basic forms of representation one has to explain the transition between implicit self-related information and explicit
 self-representation.
 
 
	

  Conventional wisdom has it that many intriguing features of indicative conditionals aren't shared by subjunctive conditionals.
 Subjunctive morphology is common in discussions of wishes and wants, however, and conditionals are commonly used in such discussions
 as well. As a result such discussions are a good place to look for subjunctive conditionals that exhibit features usually
 associated with indicatives alone. Here I offer subjunctive versions of J. L. Austin's ˜biscuit' conditionals'e.g., There
 are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them''and subjunctive versions of Allan Gibbard's ˜stand-off' or ˜Sly Pete' conditionals,
 in which speakers with no relevant false beliefs can in the same context felicitously assert conditionals with the same antecedents
 and contradictory consequents. My cases undercut views according to which the indicative/subjunctive divide marks a great
 difference in the meaning of conditionals. They also make trouble for treatments of indicative conditionals that cannot readily
 be generalized to subjunctives.
 
 
	

  The standard contextualist solution to the skeptical paradox is intended to provide a way to retain epistemic closure while
 avoiding the excessive modesty of radical skepticism and the immodesty of Moorean dogmatism. However, contextualism's opponents
 charge that its solution suffers from epistemic immodesty comparable to Moorean dogmatism. According to the standard contextualist
 solution, all contexts where an agent knows some ordinary proposition to be true are contexts where she also knows that the
 skeptical hypotheses are false. It has been hoped that contrastivist theories of knowledge can mirror the contextualist solution
 while avoiding this epistemic immodesty. I review the main problems for contrastive closure and argue that none of the arguments
 currently in the literature pose an insurmountable problem for the contrastivist solution. However, I argue that contrastivist
 theories of knowledge, like their contextualist rivals, are indeed committed to epistemic immodesty.
 
 
	

  John MacFarlane has recently presented a novel argument in support of truth-relativism. According to this, contextualists
 fail to accommodate retrospective reassessments of propositional contents, when it comes to languages which are rich enough
 to express actuality. The aim of this note is twofold. First, it is to argue that the argument can be effectively rejected, since it rests on
 an inadequate conception of actuality. Second, it is to offer a more plausible account of actuality in branching time, along
 the line of David Lewis (Noûs 4:175“88, 1970; Postscripts to ˜Anselm and actuality', Philosophical papers I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983).
 
 
	

  This paper offers a critical assessment of the current state of the debate about the identity and individuality of material
 objects. Its main aim, in particular, is to show that, in a sense to be carefully specified, the opposition between the Leibnizian
 ˜reductionist' tradition, based on discernibility, and the sort of ˜primitivism' that denies that facts of identity and individuality
 must be analysable has become outdated. In particular, it is argued that'contrary to a widespread consensus'˜naturalised'
 metaphysics supports both the acceptability of non-qualitatively grounded (both ˜contextual' and intrinsic) identity and a
 pluralistic approach to individuality and individuation. A case study is offered that focuses on non-relativistic quantum
 mechanics, in the context of which primitivism about identity and individuality, rather than being regarded as unscientific,
 is on the contrary suggested to be preferable to the complicated forms of reductionism that have recently been proposed. More
 generally, by assuming a plausible form of anti-reductionism about scientific theories and domains, it is claimed that science
 can be regarded as compatible with, or even as suggesting, the existence of a series of equally plausible grades of individuality. The kind of individuality that prevails in a certain context and at a given level can be ascertained only on the basis of
 the specific scientific theory at hand.
 
 
	

  Despite much discussion over the existence of moral facts, metaethicists have largely ignored the related question of their
 possibility. This paper addresses the issue from the moral error theorist's perspective, and shows how the arguments that
 error theorists have produced against the existence of moral facts at this world, if sound, also show that moral facts are
 impossible, at least at worlds non-morally identical to our own and, on some versions of the error theory, at any world. So
 error theorists' arguments warrant a stronger conclusion than has previously been noticed. This may appear to make them vulnerable
 to counterarguments that take the possibility of moral facts as a premise. However, I show that any such arguments would be
 question-begging.
 
 
	

  Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism,
 according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest
 that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property
 of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, but
 that it more readily accommodates the motivations that typically lead expressivists to their view in the first place.
 
 
	

  According to the Textbook View,' there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of
 the fact that only the latter defend agent-relative' principles'principles that require an agent to have a special concern
 with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology.
 I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized
 by the Textbook View.
 
 
	

  MacFarlane distinguishes context sensitivity' from indexicality,' and argues that nonindexical contextualism' has significant
 advantages over the standard indexical form. MacFarlane's substantive thesis is that the extension of an expression may depend
 on an epistemic standard variable even though its content does not. Focusing on ˜knows,' I will argue against the possibility
 of extension dependence without content dependence when factors such as meaning, time, and world are held constant, and show
 that MacFarlane's nonindexical contextualism provides no advantages over indexical contextualism. The discussion will shed
 light on the definition of indexicals as well as the meaning of ˜knows,' and highlight important constraints on the way meaning
 can be represented in semantics.
 
 
	

  I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out
 of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency
 requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming
 beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized by their role of providing
 us with doxastic instructions guided by our epistemic aims. Understanding the nature of seemings allows us to underwrite recent
 epistemological work by Michael Huemer, and shows why he was right to claim that seemings are the source of all justification.
 I then look at some objections both to my arguments regarding the connection between seemings and justification, and to Huemer's
 related Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism'.
 
 
	

  A common view is that natural language treats numbers as abstract objects, with expressions like the number of planets, eight, as well as the number eight acting as referential terms referring to numbers. In this paper I will argue that this view about reference to numbers in
 natural language is fundamentally mistaken. A more thorough look at natural language reveals a very different view of the
 ontological status of natural numbers. On this view, numbers are not primarily treated abstract objects, but rather ˜aspects'
 of pluralities of ordinary objects, namely number tropes, a view that in fact appears to have been the Aristotelian view of
 numbers. Natural language moreover provides support for another view of the ontological status of numbers, on which natural
 numbers do not act as entities, but rather have the status of plural properties, the meaning of numerals when acting like
 adjectives. This view matches contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mathematics of what Dummett called the Adjectival
 Strategy, the view on which number terms in arithmetical sentences are not terms referring to numbers, but rather make contributions
 to generalizations about ordinary (and possible) objects. It is only with complex expressions somewhat at the periphery of
 language such as the number eight that reference to pure numbers is permitted.
 
 
	

  This paper presents an argument against A D Smith's Direct Realist theory of perception, which attempts to defend Direct Realism
 against the argument from illusion by appealing to conscious perceptual states that are structured by the perceptual constancies.
 Smith's contention is that the immediate objects of perceptual awareness are characterised by these constancies, which removes
 any difficulty there may be in identifying them with the external, or normal, objects of awareness. It is here argued that
 Smith's theory does not provide an adequate defence of Direct Realism because it does not adequately deal with the difficulties
 posed by the possibility of perceptual illusion. It is argued that there remain possible illusory experiences where the immediate
 objects of awareness, which in Smith's account are those characterised by perceptual constancies, cannot be identified with
 the external objects of awareness, contrary to Direct Realism. A further argument is offered to extend this conclusion to
 all non-illusory cases, by adapting an argument of Smith's own for the generalising step of the Argument from Illusion. The
 result is that Smith's theory does not provide an adequate Direct Realist account of the possibility of perceptual illusion.
 
 
	

  In two excellent recent papers, Jacob Ross has argued that the standard arguments for the ˜thirder' answer to the Sleeping
 Beauty puzzle lead to violations of countable additivity. The problem is that most arguments for that answer generalise in
 awkward ways when he looks at the whole class of what he calls Sleeping Beauty problems. In this note I develop a new argument
 for the thirder answer that doesn't generalise in this way.
 
 
	

  A familiar feature of our moral responsibility practices are pleas: considerations, such as That was an accident', or I
 didn't know what else to do', that attempt to get agents accused of wrongdoing off the hook. But why do these pleas have the
 normative force they do in fact have? Why does physical constraint excuse one from responsibility, while forgetfulness or
 laziness does not? I begin by laying out R. Jay Wallace's (Responsibility and the moral sentiments, 1994) theory of the normative force of excuses and exemptions. For each category of plea, Wallace offers a single governing moral
 principle that explains their normative force. The principle he identifies as governing excuses is the Principle of No Blameworthiness
 without Fault: an agent is blameworthy only if he has done something wrong. The principle he identifies as governing exemptions
 is the Principle of Reasonableness: an agent is morally accountable only if he is normatively competent. I argue that Wallace's
 theory of exemptions is sound, but that his account of the normative force of excuses is problematic, in that it fails to
 explain the full range of excuses we offer in our practices, especially the excuses of addiction and extreme stress. I then
 develop a novel account of the normative force of excuses, which employs what I call the Principle of Reasonable Opportunity,'
 that can explain the full range of excuses we offer and that is deeply unified with Wallace's theory of the normative force
 of exemptions. An important implication of the theory I develop is that moral responsibility requires free will.
 
 
	

  In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen's response to Owens' Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is
 that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception
 of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the
 point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters
 into this process of deliberation, he has not, contra Steglich-Petersen, already adopted the truth aim with regard to p. In
 closing, we further suggest that proponents of the truth aim hypothesis need to focus on aim-guidance, not mere aim attribution,
 for their approach to have explanatory utility so underlining the significance of Owens' argument.
 
 
	

  It would be puzzling if the morally best agents were not so good after all. Yet one prominent account of the morally best
 agents ascribes to them the exact motivational defect that has famously been called a fetish.' The supposed defect is a desire
 to do the right thing, where this is read de dicto. If the morally best agents really are driven by this de dicto desire, and if this de dicto desire is really a fetish, then the morally best agents are moral fetishists. This is puzzling. I resolve the puzzle by showing
 that on a proper understanding of the interaction between de dicto and de re moral motivation, it is not only not fetishistic, but quite possibly desirable, to be motivated by a de dicto desire to do the right thing. My argument relies partly on an appeal to a non-buck-passing account of moral rightness, according
 to which rightness is itself an additional reason-giving property over and above the right-making properties of an action.
 If this account of moral rightness is correct, then we would expect the morally best agents to exhibit de dicto moral motivation. However, since their de dicto desire acts in concert with de re desires, there is no reason to consider it a fetish.
 
 
	

  There are at least eight good reasons practicing historians should concern themselves with counterfactual claims. Furthermore,
 four of these reasons do not even require that we are able to tell which historical counterfactuals are true and which are
 false. This paper defends the claim that these reasons to be concerned with counterfactuals are good ones, and discusses how
 each can contribute to the practice of history.
 
 
	

  Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified
 beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even
 more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise
 Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt'it can be rational to be less than fully confident
 in one's beliefs and patterns of reasoning. In rough outline, the argument is as follows: Consider a thinker who deduces a
 conclusion from a justified initial premise via an incredibly long sequence of simple competent deductions. Surely, such a
 thinker should suspect that he has made a mistake somewhere. And surely, given this, he should not believe the conclusion
 of the deduction even though he has a justified belief in the initial premise.
 
 
	

  Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ˜Appearance'
 is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets
 the extension of ˜adequately justified belief' at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard
 justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this
 norm when we express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little
 point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the
 appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed.
 
 
	

  Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249“267, 2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources
 to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan
 Salmon's (Frege's puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved
 so long as Salmon's guises are not identified with sentences.
 
 
	

  The present paper argues that there are at least two equally plausible yet mutually incompatible answers to the question of
 what is of non-instrumental epistemic value. The hypothesis invoked to explain how this can be so'moderate epistemic expressivism'holds that (a) claims about epistemic value express nothing but commitments to particular goals of inquiry, and (b) there
 are at least two viable conceptions of those goals. It is shown that such expressivism survives recent arguments against a
 more radical form of epistemic expressivism, as well as two further arguments, framed in terms of the two most promising attempts
 to ground claims about epistemic value in something other than commitments to particular conceptions of inquiry. While this
 does not establish that moderate epistemic expressivism is true, its ability to explain a significant but puzzling axiological
 datum, as well as withstand strong counterarguments, makes clear that it is a theory to be reckoned with.
 
 
	

  In this paper I develop the idea that, by answering the question whether p, you can answer the question whether you believe
 that p. In particular, I argue that judging that p is a fallible yet basic guide to whether one believes that p. I go on to
 defend my view from an important skeptical challenge, according to which my view would make it too easy to reject skeptical
 hypotheses about our access to our minds. I close by responding to the opposing view on which our beliefs themselves constitute
 our only source of first-person access to our beliefs.
 
 
	

Hmm¦ Hill on the paradox of pain
	

  Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding
 and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism
 (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001; Ethical intuitionism, 2005; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30“55, 2007), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1“30, 2000; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007) and the Direct Awareness View (Conee, Philos Phenomenol Res 4:847“857, 1998; Bonjour, In defense of pure reason, 1998). Some overlook it; others try to account for it but fail. We can account for the role of understanding in rational intuition
 by returning to the view of some of the early Rationalists, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. While that view carries a prohibitive
 cost, it does contain an insight that may help us solve the problem of giving understanding its due.
 
 
	

Reply to MacFarlane, Scharp, Shapiro, and Wright
	

Chris Hill's consciousness
	

Précis of Consciousness