Philosophical Studies

  This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value' (this journal,
 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first
 horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that
 the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists' epistemic worries.
 
	

  Whereas The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure supplements Evolution of the Social Contract by examining some of the earlier work's strategic problems in a local interaction setting, no equivalent supplement exists
 for The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. In this article, I develop a general framework for modeling the dynamics of rational deliberation in a local interaction
 setting. In doing so, I show that when local interactions are permitted, three interesting phenomena occur: (a) the attracting
 deliberative equilibria may fail to agree with any of the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, (b) deliberative dynamics
 which converged to the same deliberative outcome in The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation may lead to different deliberative outcomes here, and (c) Bayesian deliberation seems to be more likely to avoid nonstandard
 deliberative outcomes, contrary to the result reported in The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, which argued in favour of the Brown“von Neumann“Nash dynamics.
 
	

  According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about
 the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one
 particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based
 desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have.
 The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the two theses entail
 that desires are based on reasons, which they transmit but to which they cannot add. In the paper I deal with a counterexample
 to the second premise: tie-breaking desires. I first distinguish two interesting cases and argue that only the second challenges
 the premise. Then I move onto analyze this challenge by focusing on Ruth Chang's recent employment of it. I show that contrary
 to its counterintuitive appearance, the challenge can be sustained. However, I also argue that Chang overlooks the full potential
 of one particular response to the challenge: the introduction of higher-order reasons determining the normative significance
 of these desires. At the same time, I show that this response has a problem that Chang does not consider. As a result, the
 response can only partially disarm the challenge of tie-breaking desires; or not at all, depending on what significance we
 attribute to the counterexamples.
 
	

What are we to accept, and what are we to reject, while saving truth from paradox?
	

  The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has
 taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is
 false'that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians
 have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that
 PAP is false, but that it is explanatorily irrelevant. Derk Pereboom and David Hunt's buffer cases are tailor made to establish
 this conclusion. In this paper I come to the aid of PAP, showing that buffer cases provide no reason for doubting either its
 truth or relevance with respect to explaining an agent's moral responsibility.
 
	

  An impossibility result pertaining to the aggregation of individual judgements is thought by many to have significant implications
 for political theory, social epistemology and metaphysics. When members of a group hold a rational set of judgments on some
 interconnected questions, the theorem shows, it isn't always (logically) possible for them to aggregate their judgements into
 a collective one in conformity with seemingly very plausible constraints. I reject one of the constraints which engender the
 dilemma. The analogy with the lottery paradox, I argue, shows that rational belief needn't be consistent. So the alleged implications
 of the dilemma are dispelled.
 
	

  The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a
 concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or
 register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the context of two strands of work
 on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher Hitchcock, respectively. I then describe a central type of
 reasoning that, I suggest, a subject has to be able to engage in, if we are to credit her with causal concepts. I also point
 out that this type of reasoning turns on the idea of a physical connection between cause and effect, as articulated in recent
 singularist approaches of causation.
 
	

Field's logic of truth
	

  After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta's account of perceptual justification in his book Empiricism and Experience, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta's proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in
 Gupta's account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has
 not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
 
	

Replies to commentators on Saving Truth From Paradox
	

  The article is part of a symposium on Hartry Field's Saving truth from paradox'. The book is one of the most significant
 intellectual achievements of the past decades, but it is not clear what, exactly, it accomplishes. I explore some alternatives,
 relating the developed view to the intuitive, pre-theoretic notion of truth.
 
	

  The standard Kripkean semantic theories for quantified modal logic allow the individuals that exist at other worlds to vary
 from those that exist at the actual world. This causes a problem for those who deny the existence of non-actual individuals.
 I focus on two prominent strategies for solving this problem, due respectively to Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta (who identify
 the possible individuals with the actual individuals) and Alvin Plantinga (who identifies the possible individuals with the
 individual essences). I argue, contra various commentators, that both of these solutions are acceptable by the lights of those
 who deny the existence of mere possibilia.
 
	

Precis of saving truth from paradox
	

  Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain
 the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because
 it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere armchair knowledge.' Know how is a mental state characterized
 by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential
 of know how, but not propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding
 action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational
 varieties of know how.
 
	

  There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal
 determinism. One prominent such strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility
 can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing
 manipulation arguments against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical burden. Traditional
 manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility,
 but are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that incompatibilists can make do with the more
 modest (and harder to resist) claim that the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked the full force of manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. Here, I
 aim to unveil their real power.
 
	

  Theorists have spent considerable time discussing the concept of responsibility. Their discussions, however, have generally
 focused on the question of who counts as responsible, and for what. But as Gary Watson has noted, Responsibility is a triadic
 relationship: an individual (or group) is responsible to others for something' (Watson Agency and answerability: selected
 essays, 2004, p. 7). Thus, theorizing about responsibility ought to involve theorizing not just about the actor and her conduct, but also
 about those the actor is responsible to'and specifically about how these people hold the actor responsible for her conduct.
 In this paper, I give a topology of the terrain of holding others responsible. Over the course of the paper I disambiguate
 two very broad senses of holding responsible'regarding another as a responsible agent and holding another responsible for
 a particular piece of conduct. Next, I argue that the latter sense of holding responsible is a genus with two species'what
 I will call holding responsible as deep moral appraisal' and holding responsible as accountability.' Appreciating these
 distinctions, I argue, sheds considerable light on a number of questions concerning the scope and nature of our practices
 of holding others responsible. Finally, illuminating these distinct senses of holding responsible and highlighting their features
 reveals an awkwardness in the most carefully explicated and influential account of holding responsible, namely R. Jay Wallace's
 account in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.
 
	

  I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are,
 realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from
 those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that
 certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve
 the conspicuous disconnect between the sentential character of the data structures they posit and the nonsentential qualitative
 character of our perceptual experiences of corporeal (i.e., spatial, kinematic, and dynamic) properties. Along the way, I
 will question the viability of some externalist remedies for this disconnect, and I will explain why the computational theory
 put forward here falls quite clearly beyond the useful bounds of the Chinese-Room argument.
 
	

  Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many
 plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of weak awareness
 internalism' that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the Subject's Perspective Objection' horn of the dilemma. Second, we
 show that there are versions of strong awareness internalism' that do not fall prey to the dilemma's vicious regress' horn.
 We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma's
 other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat.
 
	

  This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point
 two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies, by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer
 argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable
 to do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented,
 on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try
 to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I
 defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer's
 sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable
 ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends.
 
	

Introduction