Journal for the General Philosophy of Science

  The property of being the implementation of a computational structure has been argued to be vacuously instantiated. This claim
 provides the basis for most antirealist arguments in the field of the philosophy of computation. Standard manoeuvres for combating
 these antirealist arguments treat the problem as endogenous to computational theories. The contrastive analysis of computational
 and other mathematical representations put forward here reveals that the problem should instead be treated within the more
 general framework of the Newman problem in structuralist accounts of mathematical representation. It is argued that purely
 structuralist and purely functionalist accounts of implementation are inadequate to tackle the problem. An extensive evaluation
 of semantic accounts is provided, arguing that semantic properties are, unlike structural and functional ones, suitable to
 restrict the intended domain of implementation of computational properties in such a way as to block the Newman problem. The
 semantic hypothesis is defended from a number of recent objections.
 
	

Paul Smolensky, Géraldine Legendre: The Harmonic Mind. From Neural Computation to Optimality-Theoretic Grammar. Vol. 1: Cognitive Architecture. Vol. 2: Linguistic and Philosophical Implications
	

Editorial
	

Books Received
	

  As climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty, being based on a range of future climate change scenarios, it
 becomes a crucial question how to set up this scenario range. Failing to comply with the precautionary principle, the scenario
 methodology widely used in the Third Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) seems to violate
 international environmental law, in particular a provision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To
 place climate policy advice on a sound methodological basis would imply that climate simulations which are based on complex
 climate models had, in stark contrast to their current hegemony, hardly an epistemic role to play in climate scenario analysis
 at all. Their main function might actually consist in ˜foreseeing future ozone-holes'. In order to argue for these theses,
 I explain first of all the plurality of climate models used in climate science by the failure to avoid the problem of underdetermination.
 As a consequence, climate simulation results have to be interpreted as modal sentences, stating what is possibly true of our
 climate system. This indicates that climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty. Two general methodological principles
 which may guide the construction of the scenario range are formulated and contrasted with each other: modal inductivism and
 modal falsificationism. I argue that modal inductivism, being the methodology implicitly underlying the third IPCC report,
 is severely flawed. Modal falsificationism, representing the sound alternative, would in turn require an overhaul of the IPCC
 practice.
 
	

  We compare Karl Popper's ideas concerning the falsifiability of a theory with similar notions from the part of statistical
 learning theory known as VC-theory. Popper's notion of the dimension of a theory is contrasted with the apparently very similar VC-dimension. Having located
 some divergences, we discuss how best to view Popper's work from the perspective of statistical learning theory, either as
 a precursor or as aiming to capture a different learning activity.
 
	

  According to structural realism, in mature science there is structural continuity along theoretical change. A major counterexample
 to this thesis is the transition from the Eightfold Way to the Standard Model in particle physics. Nevertheless, the notion
 of structure is significantly important in comprehending the theoretical picture of particle physics, where particles change
 and undergo transmutations, while the only thing which remains unchanged is the basic structure, i.e. the symmetry group which
 controls the transmutations. This kind of view agrees with the paradigmatic case where the structure is an internal symmetry
 and the instantiations are the elementary particles. The metaphysical view which reflects this situation is a version of ontic
 structuralism.
 
	

Zur wissenschaftstheoretischen Lehr- und Einführungsliteratur im deutschsprachigen Raum. Ein kritischer Blick auf ausgewählte neuere Veröffentlichungen
	

  For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility
 of the universe. In a recent paper, Fred Muller criticizes this argument, and its implication that Bas van Fraassen's constructive
 empiricism is untenable. In the present paper I argue that Muller's criticisms are not valid. The issue is of some importance,
 for my argument that science accepts a metaphysical proposition is the first step in a broader argument intended to demonstrate
 that we need to bring about a revolution in science, and ultimately in academic inquiry as a whole so that the basic aim becomes
 wisdom and not just knowledge.
 
	

  What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited
 different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists,
 antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse
 philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination,
 and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.
 
	

The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science: Opening Conference of the ESF-Research Networking Programme The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective' (University of Vienna, December 18“20, 2008)
	

Moritz Schlick, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, herausgegeben von Friedrich Stadler und Hans-Jürgen Wendel: Die Wiener Zeit. Aufsätze, Beiträge Rezensionen 1926“1936, Abteilung I, Band 6 (herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Johannes Friedl und Heiner Rutte)
	

Hernán Pringe: Critique of the Quantum Power of Judgement. A Transcendental Foundation of Quantum Objectivity
	

  I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism
 debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists
 in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities.
 I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component of realism about folk psychology,
 and from this I separate realism about mental entities as an ontological commitment towards them. I point out that the two
 views are mutually independent, which provides the possibility of considering folk psychology as not being in cognitive competition
 with scientific psychology. At the end I make a tentative suggestion as to how to interpret the former in order to avoid this
 conflict.
 
	

Data-Phenomena-Theories: What's the Notion of a Scientific Phenomenon Good for?
	

Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination
	

  Normative research has nearly vanished from the academic ˜mainstream' in accounting. Due to its prescriptive and value-driven
 approach, normative accounting research has been stigmatized as being unscientific and largely replaced by positive studies.
 We put this stigma into perspective. We first conceptualize the ˜positive-normative' distinction and identify this dichotomy
 in accounting research history. We then challenge the dogmatic confinement of science to descriptive (positive) approaches.
 Moreover, we debate the basic conditions for normative accounting research and conclude that methodological and epistemological
 pluralism in accounting research may help address a wide range of potential research questions. We point out that normative
 research approaches are essential in an applied science such as accounting, lest practical implications and prescriptions
 are to be the exclusive domain of accounting practice.
 
	

  There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism,
 which did not coincide with the philosophers' views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist,
 because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist on the level of models. Such a realist position
 is what I call phenomenological realism. In this paper, and by taking Bohr's debate with Einstein as a paradigm, I try to
 prove that Bohr was such a realist.
 
	

  Scientific essentialism holds that: (1) each scientific kind is associated with the same set of properties in every possible
 world; and (2) every individual member of a scientific kind belongs to that kind in every possible world in which it exists.
 Recently, Ellis (Scientific essentialism, 2001; The philosophy of nature 2002) has provided the most sustained defense of scientific essentialism, though he does not clearly distinguish these two claims.
 In this paper, I argue that both claims face a number of formidable difficulties. The necessities of scientific essentialism
 are not adequately distinguished from semantic necessities, they have not been shown to be necessities in the strictest sense,
 they must be relativized to context, and they must either be confined to a subset of scientific properties without warrant
 or their connection to causal powers must be revoked. Moreover, upon closer examination (1) turns out to be a trivial thesis
 that can be satisfied by non-kinds, and (2) is inapplicable to some of the most fundamental kinds in the basic sciences.
 
	

Günther Ludwig/Gérald Thurler: A New Foundation of Physical Theories