Journal for the General Philosophy of Science

  This discussion paper proposes that a meaningful distinction between science and technoscience can be found at the level of
 the objects of research. Both notions intermingle in the attitudes, intentions, programs and projects of researchers and research
 institutions'that is, on the side of the subjects of research. But the difference between science and technoscience becomes
 more explicit when research results are presented in particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited for
 the specific interest they hold. When an experiment is presented as scientific evidence which confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis,
 this agrees with traditional conceptions of science. When organic molecules are presented for their capacity to serve individually
 as electric wires that carry surprisingly large currents, this would be a hallmark of technoscience. Accordingly, we propose
 research on the ontology of research objects. The focus on the character and significance of research objects makes this a
 specifically philosophical project.
 
 
	

Michael Esfeld und Christian Sachse: Kausale Strukturen. Einheit und Vielfalt in der Natur und den Naturwissenschaften
	

Feyerabend und Kant: Kann das gut gehen? Paul K. Feyerabends Naturphilosophie und Kants Polemik gegen den Dogmatismus
	

John Symons and Paco Calvo (eds): The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology
	

  The problem of ceteris paribus clauses and Hempel's problem of provisos are closely-related difficulties. Both challenge advocates of accounts of scientific
 theories involving laws understood as universal generalizations, and they have been treated as identical problems. Earman
 and Roberts argue that the problems are distinct. Towards arguing against them, I characterize the relationship between Hempel's
 provisos and one way of expressing ceteris paribus clauses. I then describe the relationship between the problems attributed to the clauses, suggesting that they form a single
 problem-cluster. However, Hempel's way of formulating provisos and discussing what they involve entangles provisos with the
 problem of skepticism. This creates a departure in Hempel's discussion of provisos from the distinctive problem of vacuity
 which characterizes the problem of ceteris paribus clauses, though for different reasons than Earman and Roberts suggest.
 
 
	

  This paper aims to cast light on the reasons that explain the shift of opinion'from scepticism to realism'concerning the reality
 of atoms and molecules in the beginning of the twentieth century, in light of Jean Perrin's theoretical and experimental work
 on the Brownian movement. The story told has some rather interesting repercussions for the rationality of accepting the reality
 of explanatory posits. Section 2 presents the key philosophical debate concerning the role and status of explanatory hypotheses
 c. 1900, focusing on the work of Duhem, Stallo, Ostwald, Poincaré and Boltzmann. Section 3 examines in detail Perrin's theoretical
 account of the molecular origins of Brownian motion, reconstructs the structure and explains the strength of Perrin's argument
 for the reality of molecules. Section 4 draws three important lessons for the current debate over scientific realism.
 
 
	

  The paper explores the defence by the early sociologist of science Ludwik Fleck against the charge of relativism. It is shown
 that there are crucial and hitherto unnoticed similarities between Fleck's strategy and the attempt by his contemporary Karl
 Mannheim to distinguish between an incoherent relativism and a consistent relationism. Both authors seek to revise epistemology
 fundamentally by reinterpreting the concept of objectivity in two ways: as inner- and inter-style objectivity. The argument
 for the latter concept shows the genuine political background and intent of Fleck's sociology of science and its ambition
 to relieve the cultural struggles of his time.
 
 
	

  A re-evaluation of the notion of vacuum in quantum electrodynamics is presented, focusing on the vacuum of the quantized electromagnetic
 field. In contrast to the ˜nothingness' associated to the idea of classical vacuum, subtle aspects are found in relation to
 the vacuum of the quantized electromagnetic field both at theoretical and experimental levels. These are not the usually called
 vacuum effects. The view defended here is that the so-called vacuum effects are not due to the ground state of the quantized
 electromagnetic field. Nevertheless it is possible to maintain an empirically demonstrable notion of vacuum state that is
 consistent with the interpretation of the formalism of the theory.
 
 
	

  Stanford, in Exceeding Our Grasp, presents a powerful version of the pessimistic meta-induction. He claims that theories typically have empirically inequivalent
 but nonetheless well-confirmed, serious alternatives which are unconceived. This claim should be uncontroversial. But it alone
 is no threat to scientific realism. The threat comes from Stanford's further crucial claim, supported by historical examples,
 that a theory's unconceived alternatives are radically distinct' from it; there is no continuity'. A standard realist reply
 to the meta-induction is that past failures do not imply present ones because present theories are more successful than past
 ones. I have preferred to emphasize that present methodology is better than past ones. Stanford's response to the standard
 reply is surprisingly brief and inadequate. He defends the inference from the uncontroversial claim but not that from the
 crucial one. He does not show that past discontinuity implies present discontinuity. Realism survives.
 
 
	

  At stake in the classical realism-debate is the clash between realist and anti-realist positions. In recent years, the classical
 form of this debate has undergone a double transformation. On the one hand, the champions of realism began to pay more attention
 to the interpretative dimensions of scientific research. On the other hand, anti-realists of various sorts realized that the
 rejection of the hypostatization of a reality out there' does not imply the denial of working out a philosophically adequate
 concept of reality. Against the background of this double transformation, new arguments in the realism-debate emerged. The
 present Introduction is an attempt at systematizing these arguments within the spectrum of doctrines between the poles of
 scientific realism (exposed and defended by Howard Sankey) and hermeneutic realism (advocated by Dimitri Ginev). The authors
 try also to demonstrate that after the classical debates the issue of scientism has to be addressed in new ways.
 
 
	

  According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories
 achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis:
 Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending
 that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two
 are axiological (that is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological challenge,'
 that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the
 axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific
 subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological challenge,'
 I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses,
 the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each.
 
 
	

Recent Developments in Computing and Philosophy
	

  I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories'on the ground that
 it provides the best explanation of their success and the success of their falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best
 Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and the structural realism (SR). I show that PR and
 SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories
 possessed truthful components. PR is undone by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims
 about unobservables are false. SR backpeddles to argue that the realist is only committed to the truth about the structure
 of relations implied by the outdated theory, in order to explain its success. I argue that the structural component of theories
 is too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these
 objections to PR and SR, and also overcome the pessimistic meta-induction.
 
 
	

Eve-Marie Engels and Thomas F. Glick (Eds): The Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe
	

Erratum to: Books Received in 2007
	

Books Received in 2007