Erkenntnis

  This note employs the recently established consistency theorem for infinite regresses of probabilistic justification (Herzberg
 in Stud Log 94(3):331“345, 2010) to address some of the better-known objections to epistemological infinitism. In addition, another proof for that consistency
 theorem is given; the new derivation no longer employs nonstandard analysis, but utilises the Daniell“Kolmogorov theorem.
 
 
	

  In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ˜this assertion is improper' are paradoxical for
 the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way,
 for the knowledge account of assertion.
 
 
	

  In sections 18 and 73 of Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap famously presents what he understands to be decisive objections to Wittgenstein's Tractarian distinction between
 saying and showing. However, Carnap has been criticized in recent literature for severely misinterpreting that distinction.
 Against this criticism it is argued that Carnap reads that distinction as applying to two distinct classes of expressions
 (Unsinn and sinnlos) that he holds to emerge from his reading of Tractatus 4.1212 and related Tractarian theses. It is then argued that Carnap's counterexamples to Wittgenstein's theses are successful
 given his reading, and that our analysis of his counterexamples puts us in a unique position to reevaluate his conventionalism.
 
 
	

  The best-known argument for Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) is the ˜Why ain'cha rich?' challenge to rival Causal Decision
 Theory (CDT). The basis for this challenge is that in Newcomb-like situations, acts that conform to EDT may be known in advance
 to have the better return than acts that conform to CDT. Frank Arntzenius has recently proposed an ingenious counter argument,
 based on an example in which, he claims, it is predictable in advance that acts that conform to EDT will do less well than
 acts that conform to CDT. We raise two objections to Arntzenius's example. We argue, first, that the example is subtly incoherent,
 in a way that undermines its effectiveness against EDT; and, second, that the example relies on calculating the average return
 over an inappropriate population of acts.
 
 
	

  Horwich has attempted to combine an anti-reductionist deflationism about sentential truth with a reductionist theory of meaning.
 Price has argued that this combination is inconsistent, but his argument is fallacious. In this paper I attempt to repair
 Price's argument.
 
 
	

  Informational semantics were first developed as an interpretation of the model-theory of substructural (and especially relevant)
 logics. In this paper we argue that such a semantics is of independent value and that it should be considered as a genuine
 alternative explication of the notion of logical consequence alongside the traditional model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical
 accounts. Our starting point is the content-nonexpansion platitude which stipulates that an argument is valid iff the content of the conclusion does not exceed the combined content
 of the premises. We show that this basic platitude can be used to characterise the extension of classical as well as non-classical
 consequence relations. The distinctive trait of an informational semantics is that truth-conditions are replaced by information-conditions.
 The latter leads to an inversion of the usual order of explanation: Considerations about logical discrimination (how finely
 propositions are individuated) are conceptually prior to considerations about deductive strength. Because this allows us to
 bypass considerations about truth, an informational semantics provides an attractive and metaphysically unencumbered account
 of logical consequence, non-classical logics, logical rivalry and pluralism about logical consequence.
 
 
	

  We present a procedure which allows us to recover classical and nonclassical logical structures as concrete logics associated with physical theories expressed by means of classical languages. This procedure consists in choosing, for a given
 theory 

T
 and classical language 








\fancyscriptL


 expressing 

T, 
 an observative sublanguage L of 








\fancyscriptL


 with a notion of truth as correspondence, introducing in L a derived and theory-dependent notion of C-truth (true with certainty), defining a physical preorder
 








\prec


 induced by C-truth, and finally selecting a set of sentences Ï
 V
  that are verifiable (or testable) according to 

T, 
 on which a weak complementation
 Š¥ is induced by 

T. 
 The triple 








(fV,\prec,^)


 is then the desired concrete logic. By applying this procedure we recover a classical logic and a standard quantum logic
 as concrete logics associated with classical and quantum mechanics, respectively. The latter result is obtained in a purely
 formal way, but it can be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation of quantum mechanics that reinterprets
 quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Hence quantum logic can be considered as a mathematical
 structure formalizing the properties of the notion of verification in quantum physics. This conclusion supports the general
 idea that some nonclassical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (global pluralism) because they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide with the notion of truth as correspondence but are not
 alternative to it either.
 
 
	

  This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth'the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained.
 It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce's epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central
 argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of
 reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are popularly
 called ˜hinge propositions'.
 
 
	

  This paper concerns the issue of whether the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Neurath, Frank) can be understood
 as having provided the blueprint for a bipartite metatheory with a formal-logical part (the logic of science') supporting
 and being supported by a naturalistic-empirical part (the behavioristics of science'). A claim to this effect was recently
 met by a counterclaim that there was indeed an attempt made to broaden Carnap's formalist conception of philosophy by the
 pragmatist Morris, but that this initiative failed and that Carnap showed no interest in it. To defend the original claim
 this paper provides an analysis of Carnap and Morris on the subject matter of pragmatics in order to show that and how Carnap
 adopted Morris's proposals in so far as they agreed with bipartite metatheory conception.
 
 
	

  In the last 30 years much philosophical discussion has been generated by Kripke's proof of the necessity of origin for material
 objects presented in footnote 56 of ˜Naming and Necessity'. I consider the two most popular reconstructions of Kripke's argument:
 one appealing to the necessary sufficiency of origin, and the other employing a strong independence principle allegedly derived
 from the necessary local nature of prevention. I argue that, to achieve a general result, both reconstructions presuppose
 an implicit Humean atomistic thesis of recombination, according to which any two (non-overlapping) possible objects can simultaneously
 coexist in one and the same world. Yet recombination ill accords with the other assumptions of the proofs. I also argue that
 the locality of prevention does not entail strong independence.
 
 
	

  We develop a multi-agent deontic action logic to study the logical behaviour of two types of deontic conditionals: (1) conditional
 obligations, having the form If group 

H
 were to perform action 

aH
, then, in group 

F¢s
 interest, group 

G
 ought to perform action 

aG
' and (2) conditional permissions, having the form If group 

H
 were to perform action 

aH
, then, in group 

F¢s
 interest, group 

G
 may perform action 

aG
'. First, we define a formal language for multi-agent deontic action logic and a class of consequentialist models to interpret
 the formulas of the language. Second, we define a transformation that converts any strategic game into a consequentialist
 model. Third, we show that an outcome 

 a* 
 is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game if and only if a conjunction of certain conditional permissions is true in the
 consequentialist model that results from the transformation of that strategic game.
 
 
	

  Qualia have proved difficult to integrate into a broadly physicalistic worldview. In this paper, I argue that despite popular
 wisdom in the philosophy of mind, qualia's intrinsicality is not sufficient for their non-reducibility. Second, I diagnose
 why philosophers mistakenly focused on intrinsicality. I then proceed to argue that qualia are categorical and end with some
 reflections on how the conceptual territory looks when we keep our focus on categoricity.
 
 
	

  While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is
 a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance
 of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school
 debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
 
 
	

  CPT invariance and the spin-statistics connection are typically taken to be essential properties in relativistic quantum field
 theories (RQFTs), insofar as the CPT and Spin-Statistics theorems entail that any state of a physical system characterized
 by an RQFT must possess these properties. Moreover, in the physics literature, they are typically taken to be properties of
 particles. But there is a Received View among philosophers that RQFTs cannot fundamentally be about particles. This essay
 considers what proofs of the CPT and Spin-Statistics theorems suggest about the ontology of RQFTs, and the extent to which
 this is compatible with the Received View. I will argue that such proofs suggest the Received View's approach to ontology
 is flawed.
 
 
	

  Quinean Ontological Naturalism addresses the question What is there?' Advocates of the view maintain that we can answer this
 question by applying Quine's criterion of ontological commitment to our best scientific theories. In this paper, I discuss
 two major objections that are commonly offered to this view, what I call the Paraphrase Objection' and First Philosophy
 Objection'. I argue that these objections arise from a common uncharitable characterization of the Quinean Ontological Naturalist's
 project that fails to distinguish two distinct roles for Quine's Criterion, a descriptive role and a normative role. The objections
 target the descriptive role, but only the normative role is important to Quinean Ontological Naturalism.
 
 
	

  Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all
 sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality'thus
 threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407“432, (1989) and Bishop (2002a, b) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting
 it in conflict with the very intuitive thesis that conscious experience supervenes on physical activity. Klein in Synthese
 165:141“153, (2008) proposes a way for computationalists about experience to avoid panpsychism while still respecting the supervenience of experience
 on activity. I argue that his attempt to save computational theories of experience from Maudlin's and Bishop's critique fails.
 
 
	

  The article begins by describing two longstanding problems associated with direct inference. One problem concerns the role
 of uninformative frequency statements in inferring probabilities by direct inference. A second problem concerns the role of
 frequency statements with gerrymandered reference classes. I show that past approaches to the problem associated with uninformative
 frequency statements yield the wrong conclusions in some cases. I propose a modification of Kyburg's approach to the problem
 that yields the right conclusions. Past theories of direct inference have postponed treatment of the problem associated with
 gerrymandered reference classes by appealing to an unexplicated notion of projectability. I address the lacuna in past theories by introducing criteria for being a relevant statistic. The prescription that only relevant statistics play a role in direct inference corresponds to the sort of projectability constraints envisioned by past theories.
 
 
	

  Jonathan Weisberg (Analysis, 70(3), pp. 431“438, 2010) argues that, given that life exists, the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for life does not confirm the design hypothesis.
 And if the fact that life exists confirms the design hypothesis, fine-tuning is irrelevant. So either way, fine-tuning has
 nothing to do with it. I will defend a design argument that survives Weisberg's critique'the fact that life exists supports
 the design hypothesis, but it only does so given fine-tuning.
 
 
	

  Michael Friedman's project both historically and systematically testifies to the importance of the relativized a priori. The
 importance of implicit definitions clearly emerges from Schlick's General Theory of Knowledge. The main aim of this paper is to show the relationship between both and the relativized a priori through a detailed discussion
 of Friedman's work. Succeeding with this will amount to a contribution to recent scholarship showing the importance of Hilbert
 for Logical Empiricism.
 
 
	

  This paper gives an explication of our intuitive notion of strength of justification in a controversial debate. It defines
 a thesis' degree of justification within the theory of dialectical structures as the ratio of coherently adoptable positions
 according to which that thesis is true over all coherently adoptable positions. Broadening this definition, the notion of
 conditional degree of justification, i.e. degree of partial entailment, is introduced. Thus defined degrees of justification
 correspond to our pre-theoretic intuitions in the sense that supporting and defending a thesis t increases, whereas attacking it decreases, t's degree of justification. Moreover, it is shown that (conditional) degrees of justification are (conditional) probabilities.
 Eventually, the paper explains that it is rational to believe theses with a high degree of justification inasmuch as this
 strengthens the robustness of one's position.
 
 
	

  In this paper I argue that holes are not objects, but should instead be construed as properties or relations. The argument
 proceeds by first establishing a claim about angles: that angles are not objects, but properties or relations. It is then
 argued that holes and angles belong to the same category, on the grounds that they share distinctive existence and identity
 conditions. This provides an argument in favour of categorizing holes as one categorizes angles. I then argue that a commitment
 to the existence of properties to be identified with holes provides sufficient resources to account for true claims about
 holes.
 
 
	

  The orthodox view in statistics has it that frequentism and Bayesianism are diametrically opposed'two totally incompatible
 takes on the problem of statistical inference. This paper argues to the contrary that the two approaches are complementary
 and need to mesh if probabilistic reasoning is to be carried out correctly.
 
 
	

  Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines
 four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of
 these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized.
 In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
 
 
	

  Duncan Pritchard has, in the years following his (2005) defence of a safety-based account of knowledge in Epistemic Luck, abjured his (2005) view that knowledge can be analysed exclusively in terms of a modal safety condition. He has since (Pritchard in Synthese 158:277“297, 2007; J Philosophic Res 34:33“45, 2009a, 2010) opted for an account according to which two distinct conditions function with equal importance and weight within an analysis
 of knowledge: an anti-luck condition (safety) and an ability condition-the latter being a condition aimed at preserving what Pritchard now takes to be a fundamental insight about knowledge: that
 it arises from cognitive ability (Greco 2010; Sosa 2007, 2009). Pritchard calls his new view anti-luck virtue epistemology (ALVE). A key premise in Pritchard's argument for ALVE is what I call the independence thesis; the thesis that satisfying neither the anti-luck condition nor the ability condition entails that the other is satisfied. Pritchard's argument for the independence thesis relies crucially upon the case he makes for thinking that cognitive achievements are compatible with knowledge-undermining
 environmental luck'that is, the sort of luck widely thought to undermine knowledge in standard barn facade cases. In the first
 part of this paper, I outline the key steps in Pritchard's argument for anti-luck virtue epistemology and highlight how it is that the compatibility of cognitive achievement and knowledge- undermining environmental luck is
 indispensible to the argument's success. The second part of this paper aims to show that this compatibility premise crucial
 to Pritchard's argument is incorrect.
 
 
	

  There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to the first one, perception is representational:
 it represents the world as being a certain way. According to the second, perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver
 and a token object. These two views are thought to be incompatible. My aim is to work out the least problematic version of
 the representational view of perception that preserves the most important considerations in favor of the relational view.
 According to this version of representationalism, the properties represented in perception are tropes'abstract particulars
 that are logically incapable of being present in two distinct individuals at the same time. I call this view ˜trope representationalism'.
 
 
	

  Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all? This question often serves as a debating tactic used by theists to attack
 naturalism. Many people apparently regard the question'couched in such stark, general terms'as too profound for natural science
 to answer. It is unanswerable by science, I argue, not because it's profound or because science is superficial but because the question, as
 it stands, is ill-posed and hence has no answer in the first place. In any form in which it is well-posed, it has an answer that naturalism can in principle provide. The question therefore gives the foes of naturalism
 none of the ammunition that many on both sides of the debate think it does.
 
 
	

  We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads
 is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ˜generalized conditionalization',
 and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ˜synchronic conditionalization on old information'. We set forth
 a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune
 to two attacks that Pust (Synthese 160:97“101, 2008) has leveled at other arguments for thirdism.
 
 
	

  The paper discusses the Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT), the view that true' is inconsistent in the sense that its meaning-constitutive
 principles include all instances of the truth-schema (T). It argues that (IT) entails that anyone using true' in its ordinary
 sense is committed to all the (T)-instances and that any theory in which true' is used in that sense entails the (T)-instances
 (which, given classical logic, entail contradictions). More specifically, I argue that theorists are committed to the meaning-constitutive
 principles of logical constants, relative to the interpretation they intend thereof (e.g., classical), and that theories containing
 logical constants entail those principles. Further, I argue, since there is no relevant difference from the case of true',
 inconsistency theorists' uses of true' commit them to the (T)-instances. Adherents of (IT) are recommended, as a consequence,
 to eschew the truth-predicate. I also criticise Matti Eklund's account of how the semantic value of true' is determined,
 which can be taken as an attempt to show how true' can be consistently used, despite being inconsistent.
 
 
	

  This paper investigates the conception of causation required in order to make sense of natural selection as a causal explanation
 of changes in traits or allele frequencies. It claims that under a counterfactual account of causation, natural selection
 is constituted by the causal relevance of traits and alleles to the variation in traits and alleles frequencies. The statisticalist'
 view of selection (Walsh, Matthen, Ariew, Lewens) has shown that natural selection is not a cause superadded to the causal
 interactions between individual organisms. It also claimed that the only causation at work is those aggregated individual
 interactions, natural selection being only predictive and explanatory, but it is implicitly committed to a process-view of
 causation. I formulate a counterfactual construal of the causal statements underlying selectionist explanations, and show
 that they hold because of the reference they make to ecological reliable factors. Considering case studies, I argue that this
 counterfactual view of causal relevance proper to natural selection captures more salient features of evolutionary explanations
 than the statisticalist view, and especially makes sense of the difference between selection and drift. I eventually establish
 equivalence between causal relevance of traits and natural selection itself as a cause.
 
 
	

  Recent epistemology has introduced a new criterion of adequacy for analyses of knowledge: such an analysis, to be adequate,
 must be compatible with the common view that knowledge is better than true belief. One account which is widely thought to
 fail this test is reliabilism, according to which, roughly, knowledge is true belief formed by a reliable process. Reliabilism
 fails, so the argument goes, because of the ˜swamping problem'. In brief, provided a belief is true, we do not care whether
 or not it was formed by a reliable process. The value of reliability is ˜swamped' by the value of truth: truth combined with
 reliability is no better than truth alone. This paper approaches these issues from the perspective of decision theory. It
 argues that the ˜swamping effect' involves a sort of information-sensitivity that is well modelled decision-theoretically.
 It then employs this modelling to investigate a strategy, proposed by Goldman and Olsson, for saving reliabilism from the
 swamp, the so-called ˜conditional probability solution'. It concludes that the strategy is only partially successful.
 
 
	

  Pritchard (Synthese 175,133“51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended
 cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their
 arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that
 Pritchard's and Vaesen's cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.
 
 
	

  The Baldwin effect is a process by which learnt traits become gradually incorporated into the genome through a Darwinian mechanism.
 From its inception, the Baldwin effect has been regarded with skepticism. The objective of this paper is to relativize this
 assessment. Our contribution is two-fold. To begin with, we provide a taxonomy of the different arguments that have been advocated
 in its defense, and distinguish between three justificatory dimensions'feasibility, explanatory relevance and likelihood'that
 have been unduly conflated. Second, we sharpen the debate by providing an evolutionary game theoretic perspective that is
 able to generalize previous results. The upshot of this paper is that the mechanism envisaged by Baldwin is less puzzling
 than commonly thought.
 
 
	

  The indispensability argument is a method for showing that abstract mathematical objects exist (call this mathematical Platonism).
 Various versions of this argument have been proposed (§1). Lately, commentators seem to have agreed that a holistic indispensability
 argument (§2) will not work, and that an explanatory indispensability argument is the best candidate. In this paper I argue
 that the dominant reasons for rejecting the holistic indispensability argument are mistaken. This is largely due to an overestimation
 of the consequences that follow from evidential holism. Nevertheless, the holistic indispensability argument should be rejected,
 but for a different reason (§3)'in order that an indispensability argument relying on holism can work, it must invoke an unmotivated
 version of evidential holism. Such an argument will be unsound. Correcting the argument with a proper construal of evidential
 holism means that it can no longer deliver mathematical Platonism as a conclusion: such an argument for Platonism will be
 invalid. I then show how the reasons for rejecting the holistic indispensability argument importantly constrain what kind
 of account of explanation will be permissible in explanatory versions (§4).
 
 
	

  In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact
 that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate
 recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided
 by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I give is a more general issue about
 the possibility of emergent properties of mereological wholes. Employing plural logic there is a new way to understand such
 cases. The upshot is that plural logic greatly matters to metaphysics and hence can no longer be ignored the way it has in
 this area.
 
 
	

  According to so-called credit views of knowledge,' knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which
 an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view
 has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of
 the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience's belief it is the testimonial
 speaker rather than the audience, and so it isn't clear that testimonial knowers are appropriately creditable for the truth of their
 beliefs. I argue that the credit view of knowledge can be saved from Lackey's objection by focusing on the way in which testimonial
 knowledge is the result of an essentially social epistemic ability. While there is indeed a sense in which a testimonial knower
 is only partially epistemically responsible for her testimonial belief, this is consistent with the truth of her belief being
 creditable to her in another sense. The truth of her belief is most saliently explained by, and hence is fully creditable
 to, an essentially social epistemic ability, an ability that is only partially seated in the knowing subject.
 
 
	

  This paper considers the problem of assigning meanings to empty natural kind terms. It does so in the context of the Twin-Earth
 externalist-internalist debate about whether the meanings of natural kind terms are individuated by the external physical
 environment of the speakers using these terms. The paper clarifies and outlines the different ways in which meanings could
 be assigned to empty natural kind terms. And it argues that externalists do not have the semantic resources to assign them
 meanings. The paper ends on a sceptical note concerning the fruitfulness of using the Twin-Earth setting in debates about
 the semantics of empty natural kind terms.
 
 
	

  Jaegwon Kim argues that unreduced mental causes are excluded from efficacy because physical causes are sufficient in themselves.
 One response to this causal exclusion argument is to embrace some form of overdetermination. In this paper I consider two
 forms of overdetermination. Independent overdetermination suggests that two individually sufficient causes bring about one
 effect. This model fails because the sufficiency of one cause renders the other cause unnecessary. Dependent overdetermination
 suggests that a physical cause is necessary and sufficient for a given effect, but it necessitates a mental cause of the effect
 as well. This model fails because the necessity of the mental cause renders the physical cause individually insufficient.
 
 
	

  A possible event always seems to be more probable than an impossible event. Although this constraint, usually alluded to as
 regularity, is prima facie very attractive, it cannot hold for standard probabilities. Moreover, in a recent paper Timothy Williamson has challenged
 even the idea that regularity can be integrated into a comparative conception of probability by showing that the standard
 comparative axioms conflict with certain cases if regularity is assumed. In this note, we suggest that there is a natural
 weakening of the standard comparative axioms. It is shown that these axioms are consistent both with the regularity condition
 and with the essential feature of Williamson's example.
 
 
	

  We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such
 prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy
 for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary
 (This strategy has been pursued by Steup 2008; Weatherson 2008). In this paper I argue that this strategy is neither successful nor necessary. Our doxastic states are not voluntary in
 any interesting sense. But once we see why our doxastic states are not voluntary, we can also see that there is no apparent
 reason to think that deontic prescriptions and appraisals'epistemic ones, at any rate'presuppose doxastic voluntarism. Indeed,
 there is good reason to deny that they do so. Finally, I diagnose the misleading attraction of the idea that what I call ˜epistemic
 deontology' presupposes doxastic voluntarism.
 
 
	

  Two problems related to the biological identity of living beings are faced: the who-problem (which are the biological properties
 making that living being unique and different from the others?); the persistence-problem (what does it take for a living being
 to persist from a time to another?). They are discussed inside a molecular biology framework, which shows how epigenetics
 can be a good ground to provide plausible answers. That is, we propose an empirical solution to the who-problem and to the
 persistence-problem on the basis of the new perspectives opened by a molecular understanding of epigenetic processes. In particular,
 concerning the former, we argue that any living being is the result of the epigenetic processes that have regulated the expression
 of its genome; concerning the latter, we defend the idea that the criterion for the persistence of its identity is to be indicated
 in the continuity of those epigenetic processes. We also counteract possible objections, in particular (1) whether our approach
 has something to say at a metaphysical level; (2) how it could account for the passage from the two phenotypes of the parental
 gametes to the single phenotype of the zygote; (3) how it could account for the identity of derivatives of one living being
 that continue to live disjoined from that original living being; (4) how it could account for higher mental functions.
 
 
	

  Several philosophers have claimed that S knows p only if S' s belief is safe, where S's belief is safe iff (roughly) in nearby
 possible worlds in which S believes p, p is true. One widely held intuition many people have is that one cannot know that
 one's lottery ticket will lose a fair lottery prior to an announcement of the winner, regardless of how probable it is that
 it will lose. Duncan Pritchard has claimed that a chief advantage of safety theory is that it can explain the lottery intuition
 without succumbing to skepticism. I argue that Pritchard is wrong. If a version of safety theory can explain the lottery intuition,
 it will also lead to skepticism.
 
 
	

  How is the debate between presentism and eternalism to be characterized? It is usual to suggest that this debate about time
 is analogous to the debate between the actualist and the possibilist about modality. I think that this suggestion is right.
 In what follows I pursue the analogy more strictly than is usual and offer a characterization of what is at the core of the
 dispute between presentists and eternalists that may be immune to worries often raised about the substantiality of the debate.
 I suggest that the debate be characterized in Lewisean terms and define positions I call *Lewisean* eternalism and anti-*Lewisean*'
 presentism (analogous to Lewisean possibilism and anti-Lewisean actualism). I explain some advantages of the proposal and
 discuss some objections. I conclude that pursuing the analogy strictly offers the prospect of giving clear sense to a controversy
 which otherwise seems to many deeply obscure.
 
 
	

  This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing anti-individualism' about the contents of perceptual states to give an account
 of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge's (2003) paper, Perceptual Entitlement'. I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I
 go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist
 views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts which instead give a more prominent role
 to consciousness.
 
 
	

  I pursue an answer to the psychological question what is it for S to presuppose that p?' I will not attempt a general answer.
 Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential
 presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions'one that is constituted by a specific
 reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components'
 operation as univocal in a line of reasoning. I will argue that the exercise of this reasoning competence constitutes certain
 inferential presuppositions. More specifically, I outline a conception of an inferential presupposition as a non-attitudinal
 but genuinely psychological and rationally committing relation that holds between a reasoner and a proposition. Thus, inferential
 presuppositions may be distinguished from tacit or standing attitudes that function as premise-beliefs in reasoning. Likewise
 inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from other kinds of presuppositions. In conclusion, I note some features
 of inferential presuppositions that bear on the epistemology of inference.
 
 
	

  The doctrine of the specious present that we perceive or, at least, seem to perceive a period of time is often taken to be
 an obvious claim about perception. Yet, it also seems just as commonly rejected as being incoherent. In this paper, following
 a distinction between three conceptions of the specious present, it is argued that the incoherence is due to hidden metaphysical
 assumptions about perception and time. For those who do not hold such assumptions, so long as we are clear about what the
 doctrine is really saying, we can make perfect sense of the specious present doctrine.