Causal Slingshots
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Sat, 14 Nov 2009 07:08:57 GMT
Abstract:
Causal slingshots are formal arguments advanced by proponents of an event ontology of token-level causation which, in the
end, are intended to show two things: (i) The logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on token level features
a binary predicate ¦ causes ¦' and (ii) that predicate takes events as arguments. Even though formalisms are only revealing
with respect to the logical form of natural language statements, if the latter are shown to be adequately captured within
a corresponding formalism, proponents of slingshots usually take the adequacy of their formalizations for granted without
justifying it. The first part of this paper argues that the most discussed version of a causal slingshot, viz. the one e.g.
presented by Davidson (Essays on actions and events. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), can indeed be refuted for relying on
an inadequate formal apparatus. In contrast, the formal means of Gödel's (The philosophy of Betrand Russell. New York, Tudor,
1944) often neglected slingshot are shown to stand on solid ground in the second part of the paper. Nonetheless, I contend
that Gödel's slingshot does only half the work friends of event causation would like it to do. It provides good reasons for
(i) but not for (ii).
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | slingshot | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...the most discussed version of a causal slingshot viz the one e g ...
...tudor 1944 often neglected slingshot are shown to stand on solid ground ...
...contend that g del s slingshot does only half the work friends of ...
|
| 1 | g | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...slingshot viz the one e g presented by davidson essays ...
...in contrast the formal means of g del s the philosophy of ...
... nonetheless i contend that g del s slingshot does only half ...
|
| 2 | causal | 3 |
| Excerpts:
... causal slingshots are formal arguments advanced by proponents ...
... the logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on token level features a ...
...that the most discussed version of a causal slingshot viz the one e ...
|
| 3 | formal | 3 |
| Excerpts:
... causal slingshots are formal arguments advanced by proponents of an event ...
...refuted for relying on an inadequate formal apparatus in contrast the formal ...
...formal apparatus in contrast the formal means of g del s ...
|
| 4 | logical | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...two things i the logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on ...
...only revealing with respect to the logical form of natural language statements if ...
|
| 5 | del | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... the formal means of g del s the philosophy of betrand russell ...
... i contend that g del s slingshot does only half the work ...
|
| 6 | form | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...things i the logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on token ...
...revealing with respect to the logical form of natural language statements if the ...
|
| 7 | part | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...without justifying it the first part of this paper argues that the most ...
...stand on solid ground in the second part of the paper nonetheless i ...
|
| 8 | only | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...as arguments even though formalisms are only revealing with respect to the logical ...
...that g del s slingshot does only half the work friends of event causation ...
|
| 9 | ii | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... causes and ii that predicate takes events as arguments ...
... i but not for ii ...
|
The Discrimination Argument Revisited
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Sun, 25 Oct 2009 07:09:50 GMT
Abstract:
The first explicit argument for the incompatibility of externalism in the philosophy of mind and a priori self-knowledge is
Boghossian's discrimination argument. In this essay, I oppose the third premise of this argument, trying to show by means
of a thought experiment that possessing the twater thought' is not an alternative, a fortiori not a relevant alternative,
to having the water thought.' I then examine a modified version of Boghossian's argument. The attempt is made to substantiate
the claim that the standard incompatibilist support for its second premise is untenable. Furthermore, a third Boghossian-style
argument is rejected on the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way suggested by incompatibilists
or its third premise is mistaken because having the twater thought' instead of the water thought' is not relevant. Finally,
it is argued that the discrimination argument cannot be saved by invoking closure. The upshot of my discussion is that a compatibilist
can dismiss Boghossian-style arguments for incompatibilism without having to deal with fundamental issues concerning self-knowledge
and the nature of slow switching.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | thought | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...to show by means of a thought experiment that possessing the twater thought ...
...a thought experiment that possessing the twater thought is not an alternative a ...
...alternative to having the water thought i then examine a modified ...
...premise is mistaken because having the twater thought instead of the water thought ...
...twater thought instead of the water thought is not relevant finally ...
|
| 1 | boghossian | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...and a priori self knowledge is boghossian s discrimination argument in this essay ...
...i then examine a modified version of boghossian s argument the attempt is made ...
...is untenable furthermore a third boghossian style argument is rejected on the ...
...is that a compatibilist can dismiss boghossian style arguments for incompatibilism without having to ...
|
| 2 | premise | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...this essay i oppose the third premise of this argument trying to show ...
...the standard incompatibilist support for its second premise is untenable furthermore a third ...
...on the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way suggested ...
...suggested by incompatibilists or its third premise is mistaken because having the twater thought ...
|
| 3 | third | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...in this essay i oppose the third premise of this argument trying to ...
...premise is untenable furthermore a third boghossian style argument is rejected on ...
...way suggested by incompatibilists or its third premise is mistaken because having the twater ...
|
| 4 | having | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...not a relevant alternative to having the water thought i then ...
...or its third premise is mistaken because having the twater thought instead of the ...
...dismiss boghossian style arguments for incompatibilism without having to deal with fundamental issues concerning self ...
|
| 5 | style | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...untenable furthermore a third boghossian style argument is rejected on the ground ...
...that a compatibilist can dismiss boghossian style arguments for incompatibilism without having to deal ...
|
| 6 | cannot | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way suggested by ...
...it is argued that the discrimination argument cannot be saved by invoking closure the ...
|
| 7 | second | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...that the standard incompatibilist support for its second premise is untenable furthermore a ...
...rejected on the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way ...
|
| 8 | alternative | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...the twater thought is not an alternative a fortiori not a relevant alternative ...
...alternative a fortiori not a relevant alternative to having the water thought ...
|
| 9 | relevant | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...an alternative a fortiori not a relevant alternative to having the water ...
...of the water thought is not relevant finally it is argued ...
|
Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Thu, 22 Oct 2009 18:59:45 GMT
Abstract:
This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle
is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences.
While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented
that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided
on the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms.
It is argued that it is possible to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims. As against
the epistemic relativist, it is possible to provide an objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | epistemic | 8 |
| Excerpts:
...a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism the case of the azande ...
...employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify ...
...relativism an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based ...
...a naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms it is argued that ...
...possible to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims ...
...ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims as against the epistemic ...
...epistemic aims as against the epistemic relativist it is possible to provide ...
...objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms ...
|
| 1 | norms | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms it is argued that it ...
...to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims as ...
...basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms ...
|
| 2 | relativism | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism the case of the azande poison ...
...a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism an argument in support of epistemic ...
... an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on ...
|
| 3 | response | 3 |
| Excerpts:
... this paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism ...
...sceptical problem of the criterion a response to the resulting relativistic position is then ...
... on the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach ...
|
| 4 | naturalistic | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... this paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism ...
...particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms ...
|
| 5 | possible | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... it is argued that it is possible to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic ...
... the epistemic relativist it is possible to provide an objective basis for the ...
|
| 6 | alternative | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to ...
...an objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms ...
|
| 7 | basis | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...position is then provided on the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined ...
...it is possible to provide an objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms ...
|
| 8 | scepticism | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... while a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism an argument in support ...
...the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the ...
|
| 9 | combined | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the warrant ...
|
The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Thu, 22 Oct 2009 06:18:24 GMT
Abstract:
There is growing interest in understanding and eliciting division of labor within groups of scientists. This paper illustrates
the need for this division of labor through a historical example, and a formal model is presented to better analyze situations
of this type. Analysis of this model reveals that a division of labor can be maintained in two different ways: by limiting
information or by endowing the scientists with extreme beliefs. If both features are present however, cognitive diversity
is maintained indefinitely, and as a result agents fail to converge to the truth. Beyond the mechanisms for creating diversity
suggested here, this shows that the real epistemic goal is not diversity but transient diversity.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | diversity | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...both features are present however cognitive diversity is maintained indefinitely and as ...
...truth beyond the mechanisms for creating diversity suggested here this shows that ...
...that the real epistemic goal is not diversity but transient diversity ...
...epistemic goal is not diversity but transient diversity ...
|
| 1 | labor | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...interest in understanding and eliciting division of labor within groups of scientists this paper ...
... the need for this division of labor through a historical example and a ...
...this model reveals that a division of labor can be maintained in two different ways ...
|
| 2 | division | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...is growing interest in understanding and eliciting division of labor within groups of scientists ...
...paper illustrates the need for this division of labor through a historical example ...
...analysis of this model reveals that a division of labor can be maintained in two ...
|
| 3 | scientists | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...eliciting division of labor within groups of scientists this paper illustrates the need ...
...limiting information or by endowing the scientists with extreme beliefs if both features ...
|
| 4 | maintained | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...that a division of labor can be maintained in two different ways by limiting ...
...present however cognitive diversity is maintained indefinitely and as a result agents ...
|
| 5 | model | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...a historical example and a formal model is presented to better analyze situations ...
...of this type analysis of this model reveals that a division of labor can ...
|
| 6 | indefinitely | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...however cognitive diversity is maintained indefinitely and as a result agents fail ...
|
| 7 | cognitive | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...if both features are present however cognitive diversity is maintained indefinitely and ...
|
| 8 | agents | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...maintained indefinitely and as a result agents fail to converge to the truth ...
|
| 9 | result | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...is maintained indefinitely and as a result agents fail to converge to the truth ...
|
Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Thu, 22 Oct 2009 06:18:21 GMT
Abstract:
Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic
accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer,
Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based
account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios'scenarios in which the causal truths depend
on more than one cause. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for both causal-law approaches to causation (Cartwright 1983) and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities (Dupré 1993; Glennan 1997, pp. 605“626). However, whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely because they promise to handle complicated
causal scenarios, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity-based mechanisms.
The activity-based account proposed in Machamer et al. (2000, pp. 1“25) is problematic as an ontic account, I will argue. It seems necessary to ask, of any ontic account, how well it
performs in causal situations where'at the explanandum level of mechanism'no activity occurs. In addition, it should be asked how well the activity-based account performs in situations where there are
too few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum. The first situation presents an explanandum-problem
and the second situation presents an explanans-problem'I will argue'both of which threaten activity-based frameworks.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | activity | 7 |
| Excerpts:
...and carl craver reintroduces the concept of activity in this paper i ask whether ...
...paper i ask whether this influential and activity based account of mechanisms is viable ...
...more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity based mechanisms the activity based ...
...on activity based mechanisms the activity based account proposed in machamer et al ...
...at the explanandum level of mechanism no activity occurs in addition it should ...
...it should be asked how well the activity based account performs in situations where there ...
...i will argue both of which threaten activity based frameworks ...
|
| 1 | based | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...i ask whether this influential and activity based account of mechanisms is viable as ...
...thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity based mechanisms the activity based account ...
...activity based mechanisms the activity based account proposed in machamer et al ...
...should be asked how well the activity based account performs in situations where there are ...
...will argue both of which threaten activity based frameworks ...
|
| 2 | causal | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...on polygenic scenarios scenarios in which the causal truths depend on more than one ...
...shown to be a problem for both causal law approaches to causation cartwright 1983 ...
...because they promise to handle complicated causal scenarios polygenic causation needs to be ...
... how well it performs in causal situations where at the explanandum level of ...
...few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum the first ...
|
| 3 | causation | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation ontic accounts differ quite radically ...
...one cause the importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by mill ...
...problem for both causal law approaches to causation cartwright 1983 and accounts of ...
... cartwright 1983 and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities dupr ...
...handle complicated causal scenarios polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in ...
|
| 4 | ontic | 5 |
| Excerpts:
... accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as ...
...understanding of mechanism and of causation ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ...
...account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account i focus on polygenic scenarios ...
...1 25 is problematic as an ontic account i will argue it ...
...seems necessary to ask of any ontic account how well it performs ...
|
| 5 | polygenic | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...an ontic account i focus on polygenic scenarios scenarios in which the causal truths ...
...than one cause the importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by mill ...
...to handle complicated causal scenarios polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly ...
...too few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum the ...
|
| 6 | accounts | 4 |
| Excerpts:
... accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised ...
...mechanism and of causation ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies ...
...to causation cartwright 1983 and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities ...
...626 however whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely because they ...
|
| 7 | scenarios | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...ontic account i focus on polygenic scenarios scenarios in which the causal truths depend ...
...account i focus on polygenic scenarios scenarios in which the causal truths depend ...
...they promise to handle complicated causal scenarios polygenic causation needs to be examined ...
|
| 8 | problem | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...has since been shown to be a problem for both causal law approaches to causation ...
... the first situation presents an explanandum problem and the second situation presents an ...
...and the second situation presents an explanans problem i will argue both of which threaten ...
|
| 9 | explanandum | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...performs in causal situations where at the explanandum level of mechanism no activity occurs ...
...match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum the first situation presents an explanandum ...
...explanandum the first situation presents an explanandum problem and the second situation presents ...
|
The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Wed, 07 Oct 2009 07:02:35 GMT
Abstract:
Frank Jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism. One of the most
interesting criticisms of Jackson's position is what I call the ˜inconsistency objection'. The inconsistency objection says
that Jackson's position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument. The inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently, including Michael
Watkins, Fredrik Stjernberg, and Neil Campbell. Surprisingly enough, while Jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency
objection is ˜the most powerful reply to the knowledge argument' he knows of, it has never been discussed critically. The
aim of this paper is to evaluate the objection and to identify and consider its implications. The objection is alleged to
be based on a causal theory of knowledge. I argue that the objection fails by showing that any causal theory of knowledge
is such that it is either false or does not support the inconsistency objection. In order to defend my argument, I offer a
hypothesis concerning phenomenal knowledge.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | objection | 8 |
| Excerpts:
...is what i call the inconsistency objection the inconsistency objection says ...
... inconsistency objection the inconsistency objection says that jackson s position is ...
...undermines the knowledge argument the inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently ...
...himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is the most powerful reply to ...
...of this paper is to evaluate the objection and to identify and consider its implications ...
...identify and consider its implications the objection is alleged to be based on ...
...of knowledge i argue that the objection fails by showing that any causal theory ...
...false or does not support the inconsistency objection in order to defend my argument ...
|
| 1 | knowledge | 6 |
| Excerpts:
...endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism one of the ...
...position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument the inconsistency objection has been ...
... the most powerful reply to the knowledge argument he knows of it ...
...be based on a causal theory of knowledge i argue that the objection fails ...
...by showing that any causal theory of knowledge is such that it is either ...
...i offer a hypothesis concerning phenomenal knowledge ...
|
| 2 | inconsistency | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...position is what i call the inconsistency objection the inconsistency objection says ...
...the inconsistency objection the inconsistency objection says that jackson s position ...
...epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument the inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers ...
...while jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is the most powerful ...
...either false or does not support the inconsistency objection in order to defend my ...
|
| 3 | jackson | 4 |
| Excerpts:
... frank jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his ...
...of the most interesting criticisms of jackson s position is what i call the ...
... the inconsistency objection says that jackson s position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines ...
...neil campbell surprisingly enough while jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency ...
|
| 4 | theory | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...to be based on a causal theory of knowledge i argue that the ...
...objection fails by showing that any causal theory of knowledge is such that it ...
|
| 5 | causal | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...alleged to be based on a causal theory of knowledge i argue that ...
...the objection fails by showing that any causal theory of knowledge is such that ...
|
| 6 | position | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...most interesting criticisms of jackson s position is what i call the inconsistency ...
...inconsistency objection says that jackson s position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge ...
|
| 7 | been | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...knowledge argument the inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently including ...
...he knows of it has never been discussed critically the aim of ...
|
| 8 | because | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... frank jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines ...
... that jackson s position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument the ...
|
| 9 | undermines | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism one of the most ...
...jackson s position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument the inconsistency objection ...
|
Morgenbesser's Coin, Counterfactuals, and Causal Versus Probabilistic Independence
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 06:46:50 GMT
Abstract:
It is widely held that, as Morgenbesser's case is usually taken to show, considerations of causal or probabilistic dependence
should enter into the evaluation of counterfactuals. This paper challenges that idea. I present a modified version of Morgenbesser's
case and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals are in serious trouble. Specifically, I show how probabilistic
approaches run into a dilemma in characterizing probabilistic independence. The modified case also illustrates a difficulty
in defining causal independence. I close with a suggestion for a strategy to handle this difficulty.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | probabilistic | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...to show considerations of causal or probabilistic dependence should enter into the evaluation ...
...morgenbesser s case and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals are in serious trouble ...
...trouble specifically i show how probabilistic approaches run into a dilemma in ...
...approaches run into a dilemma in characterizing probabilistic independence the modified case also illustrates ...
|
| 1 | show | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...morgenbesser s case is usually taken to show considerations of causal or probabilistic dependence ...
...version of morgenbesser s case and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals are in ...
...in serious trouble specifically i show how probabilistic approaches run into a ...
|
| 2 | case | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...widely held that as morgenbesser s case is usually taken to show considerations ...
...a modified version of morgenbesser s case and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals ...
...in characterizing probabilistic independence the modified case also illustrates a difficulty in defining ...
|
| 3 | difficulty | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... the modified case also illustrates a difficulty in defining causal independence i ...
...suggestion for a strategy to handle this difficulty ...
|
| 4 | causal | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...usually taken to show considerations of causal or probabilistic dependence should enter into ...
...also illustrates a difficulty in defining causal independence i close with a suggestion ...
|
| 5 | into | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...causal or probabilistic dependence should enter into the evaluation of counterfactuals this paper ...
...i show how probabilistic approaches run into a dilemma in characterizing probabilistic independence ...
|
| 6 | counterfactuals | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... should enter into the evaluation of counterfactuals this paper challenges that idea ...
...case and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals are in serious trouble specifically ...
|
| 7 | modified | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...challenges that idea i present a modified version of morgenbesser s case and ...
...dilemma in characterizing probabilistic independence the modified case also illustrates a difficulty in ...
|
| 8 | approaches | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...s case and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals are in serious trouble ...
...specifically i show how probabilistic approaches run into a dilemma in characterizing probabilistic ...
|
| 9 | morgenbesser | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...it is widely held that as morgenbesser s case is usually taken to show ...
... i present a modified version of morgenbesser s case and show how probabilistic ...
|
Degrees of Causation
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 17:38:17 GMT
Abstract:
The primary aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and examine the
way in which it can be formally defined. This should go some way to filling out a gap in the legal and philosophical literature
on causation. By adopting the conception of a cause as a necessary element of a sufficient set (the so-called NESS test) we
show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given clear and even empirical meaning. We then apply a game theoretical
framework to derive a measure of causal contribution. Our favoured measure turns out to be a generalised version of the normalized
Penrose“Banzhaf index of voting power.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | contribution | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and examine the ...
...framework to derive a measure of causal contribution our favoured measure turns out to ...
|
| 1 | causation | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...the legal and philosophical literature on causation by adopting the conception of a ...
...show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given clear and even empirical ...
|
| 2 | way | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...for actual events and examine the way in which it can be formally defined ...
...formally defined this should go some way to filling out a gap in the ...
|
| 3 | degrees | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...paper is to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and ...
...we show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given clear and ...
|
| 4 | causal | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and examine the ...
... framework to derive a measure of causal contribution our favoured measure turns out ...
|
| 5 | out | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...this should go some way to filling out a gap in the legal and philosophical ...
...causal contribution our favoured measure turns out to be a generalised version of the ...
|
| 6 | measure | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...game theoretical framework to derive a measure of causal contribution our favoured measure ...
...measure of causal contribution our favoured measure turns out to be a generalised version ...
|
| 7 | concept | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...of this paper is to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual ...
...test we show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given ...
|
| 8 | game | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...empirical meaning we then apply a game theoretical framework to derive a measure ...
|
| 9 | theoretical | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...meaning we then apply a game theoretical framework to derive a measure of ...
|
Strong Global Supervenience is Valuable
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 08:25:49 GMT
Abstract:
It is generally assumed that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can
also be said with the notion of strong supervenience. It is argued here, however, that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically
distinctive role to play. It is shown that when the relevant sets include relations, strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct. It is then concluded that there are claims about dependence
of relations that can be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the local' (individual) one.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | strong | 6 |
| Excerpts:
...said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said ...
...also be said with the notion of strong supervenience it is argued here ...
...is argued here however that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive ...
...when the relevant sets include relations strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct ...
...include relations strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct it is then ...
...be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the local ...
|
| 1 | supervenience | 6 |
| Excerpts:
...dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said with the ...
...be said with the notion of strong supervenience it is argued here however ...
...here however that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive role to ...
...relevant sets include relations strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct it ...
...relations strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct it is then concluded ...
...made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the local ...
|
| 2 | global | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said with ...
...argued here however that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive role ...
...the relevant sets include relations strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct ...
...relations that can be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with ...
|
| 3 | notion | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also ...
...can also be said with the notion of strong supervenience it is argued ...
...that can be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the ...
|
| 4 | relations | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...shown that when the relevant sets include relations strong global supervenience and strong supervenience ...
...there are claims about dependence of relations that can be made with the global ...
|
| 5 | dependence | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience ...
...then concluded that there are claims about dependence of relations that can be made ...
|
| 6 | said | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...generally assumed that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong ...
...strong global supervenience can also be said with the notion of strong supervenience ...
|
| 7 | include | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...is shown that when the relevant sets include relations strong global supervenience and strong ...
|
| 8 | relevant | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... it is shown that when the relevant sets include relations strong global supervenience ...
|
| 9 | distinct | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct it is then concluded that there ...
|
Presentism and Truth-making
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 08:25:48 GMT
Abstract:
Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that
if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second,
if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth-maker principle in order to avoid the demand for
truth-makers for talk about the non-present.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | truth | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...is no sensible way to pin a truth maker objection on presentism first ...
...i suggest that if we adopt truth maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition ...
...then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth maker principle in order to avoid the ...
...order to avoid the demand for truth makers for talk about the non present ...
|
| 1 | maker | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...no sensible way to pin a truth maker objection on presentism first i ...
...suggest that if we adopt truth maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ...
...the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth maker principle in order to avoid the demand ...
|
| 2 | maximalism | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...that if we adopt truth maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological ...
... second if we deny maximalism then the presentist can sensibly restrict ...
|
| 3 | presentist | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...we adopt truth maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity ...
...if we deny maximalism then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth maker principle ...
|
| 4 | sensibly | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...deny maximalism then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth maker principle in order ...
|
| 5 | impunity | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity second if we deny ...
|
| 6 | second | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity second if we deny maximalism ...
|
| 7 | deny | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...impunity second if we deny maximalism then the presentist can sensibly ...
|
| 8 | restrict | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...maximalism then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth maker principle in order to ...
|
| 9 | order | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...sensibly restrict the truth maker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth ...
|
A Solution to the Cable Guy Paradox
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 19:00:42 GMT
Abstract:
The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive
between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two
bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval
is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice worthy. In this paper, I rebut the argument.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | m | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...guy will definitely come between 8 a m and 4 p m ...
...8 a m and 4 p m and i can bet on ...
|
| 1 | will | 2 |
| Excerpts:
... the cable guy will definitely come between 8 a m ...
...one of two possibilities that he will arrive between 8 and 12 ...
|
| 2 | tantalising | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...attractive yet hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the ...
|
| 3 | purports | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval ...
|
| 4 | show | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval is ...
|
| 5 | presented | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...are equally attractive yet hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show ...
|
| 6 | yet | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...two bets are equally attractive yet hajek has presented a tantalising argument that ...
|
| 7 | hajek | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... bets are equally attractive yet hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports ...
|
| 8 | later | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...argument that purports to show that the later interval is initial appearances to ...
|
| 9 | initial | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...that the later interval is initial appearances to the contrary more choice ...
|
Mereological Essentialism, Composition, and Stuff: A Reply to Kristie Miller
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 15:55:32 GMT
Abstract:
Mereological Essentialism, Composition, and Stuff: A Reply to Kristie Miller
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | kristie | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... and stuff a reply to kristie miller ...
|
| 1 | miller | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...and stuff a reply to kristie miller ...
|
| 2 | reply | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... composition and stuff a reply to kristie miller ...
|
| 3 | stuff | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... mereological essentialism composition and stuff a reply to kristie miller ...
|
| 4 | essentialism | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... mereological essentialism composition and stuff a ...
|
| 5 | composition | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... mereological essentialism composition and stuff a reply to ...
|
| 6 | mereological | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... mereological essentialism composition and stuff ...
|
What Fitness Can't Be
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 20 Jul 2009 23:45:33 GMT
Abstract:
Recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics. To accommodate examples from the population
genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity
to contribute descendants to some future generation. We argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper
ramifications of the examples they cite. These examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine
fitness. We go on to argue for the more general thesis that no account of fitness can satisfy the desiderata that have motivated
the propensity account.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | fitness | 4 |
| Excerpts:
...recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics to accommodate examples ...
...population genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined broadly as a family ...
...factors outside of propensities that determine fitness we go on to argue for ...
...more general thesis that no account of fitness can satisfy the desiderata that have motivated ...
|
| 1 | propensity | 4 |
| Excerpts:
... recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics ...
...a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute descendants to some future ...
...future generation we argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications ...
...the desiderata that have motivated the propensity account ...
|
| 2 | examples | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...fitness have turned critics to accommodate examples from the population genetics literature they ...
...misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite these examples demonstrate why ...
...of the examples they cite these examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of ...
|
| 3 | propensities | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...better defined broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute ...
...demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine fitness we go ...
|
| 4 | cite | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...deeper ramifications of the examples they cite these examples demonstrate why there are ...
|
| 5 | demonstrate | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...the examples they cite these examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities ...
|
| 6 | why | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...examples they cite these examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that ...
|
| 7 | deeper | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite ...
|
| 8 | theorists | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...generation we argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of ...
|
| 9 | misunderstood | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...we argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples ...
|
No Route to Material Origin Essentialism?
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 29 Jun 2009 14:28:22 GMT
Abstract:
In the last 30 years repeated attempts have been made to develop a proof-sketch Kripke gave for essentialism about material
origins into a cogent argument. I argue that there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed, and so we should
likewise expect future attempts to fail.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | attempts | 3 |
| Excerpts:
... in the last 30 years repeated attempts have been made to develop a proof ...
...there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed and so we should ...
...so we should likewise expect future attempts to fail ...
|
| 1 | reasons | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... i argue that there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed ...
|
| 2 | all | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...argue that there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed and so ...
|
| 3 | general | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...argument i argue that there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed ...
|
| 4 | failed | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...general reasons that all such attempts have failed and so we should likewise ...
|
| 5 | cogent | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...essentialism about material origins into a cogent argument i argue that there are ...
|
| 6 | into | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...gave for essentialism about material origins into a cogent argument i argue that ...
|
| 7 | should | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...attempts have failed and so we should likewise expect future attempts to fail ...
|
| 8 | fail | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...should likewise expect future attempts to fail ...
|
| 9 | future | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...and so we should likewise expect future attempts to fail ...
|
Reconsidering the Role of Bridge Laws In Inter-Theoretical Reductions
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Mon, 29 Jun 2009 14:28:21 GMT
Abstract:
The present paper surveys the three most prominent accounts in contemporary debates over how sound reduction should be executed.
The classical Nagelian model of reduction derives the laws of the target-theory from the laws of the base theory plus some auxiliary premises (so-called bridge laws)
connecting the entities of the target and the base theory. The functional model of reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of the target entities referring to their causal relations to base entities. The new-wave model of reduction deduces not the original target theory but an analogous image of it, which remains inside the vocabulary of the base theory.
One of the fundamental motivations of both the functional and the new-wave model is to show that bridge laws can be evaded.
The present paper argues that bridge laws'in the original Nagelian sense'are inevitable, i.e. that none of these models can
evade them. On the one hand, the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws, since its fundamental concept, functionalization,
is an inter-theoretical process dealing with entities of two different theories. Theoretical entities of different theories
(in a general heterogeneous case) do not have common causal relations, so the functionalization of an entity'without bridge
laws'can only be executed in the framework of its own theory. On the other hand, the so-called images of the new-wave account
cannot be constructed without the use of bridge laws. These connecting principles are needed to guide the process of deduction
within the base theory; without them one would not be able to recognize if the deduced structure was an image of the target
theory.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | laws | 8 |
| Excerpts:
...classical nagelian model of reduction derives the laws of the target theory from the laws ...
...laws of the target theory from the laws of the base theory plus some auxiliary ...
...some auxiliary premises so called bridge laws connecting the entities of the ...
...wave model is to show that bridge laws can be evaded the present ...
... the present paper argues that bridge laws in the original nagelian sense are inevitable ...
...the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws since its fundamental concept functionalization ...
...functionalization of an entity without bridge laws can only be executed in the framework ...
...be constructed without the use of bridge laws these connecting principles are needed to ...
|
| 1 | theory | 8 |
| Excerpts:
...reduction derives the laws of the target theory from the laws of the base theory ...
...theory from the laws of the base theory plus some auxiliary premises so called ...
...entities of the target and the base theory the functional model of reduction emphasizes ...
...of reduction deduces not the original target theory but an analogous image of it ...
...remains inside the vocabulary of the base theory one of the fundamental motivations ...
...executed in the framework of its own theory on the other hand the ...
...process of deduction within the base theory without them one would not be ...
...was an image of the target theory ...
|
| 2 | bridge | 6 |
| Excerpts:
...plus some auxiliary premises so called bridge laws connecting the entities of ...
...new wave model is to show that bridge laws can be evaded the ...
... the present paper argues that bridge laws in the original nagelian sense are ...
... the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws since its fundamental concept ...
...so the functionalization of an entity without bridge laws can only be executed in ...
...cannot be constructed without the use of bridge laws these connecting principles are needed ...
|
| 3 | model | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...be executed the classical nagelian model of reduction derives the laws of the ...
...and the base theory the functional model of reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of ...
...to base entities the new wave model of reduction deduces not the original target ...
...both the functional and the new wave model is to show that bridge laws can ...
...on the one hand the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws since ...
|
| 4 | target | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...of reduction derives the laws of the target theory from the laws of the base ...
... connecting the entities of the target and the base theory the functional ...
...reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of the target entities referring to their causal relations to ...
...model of reduction deduces not the original target theory but an analogous image of it ...
...deduced structure was an image of the target theory ...
|
| 5 | reduction | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...accounts in contemporary debates over how sound reduction should be executed the classical ...
... the classical nagelian model of reduction derives the laws of the target theory ...
...base theory the functional model of reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of the target ...
...entities the new wave model of reduction deduces not the original target theory but ...
...one hand the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws since its fundamental ...
|
| 6 | entities | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...called bridge laws connecting the entities of the target and the base theory ...
...emphasizes the causal definitions of the target entities referring to their causal relations to base ...
...referring to their causal relations to base entities the new wave model of reduction ...
...is an inter theoretical process dealing with entities of two different theories theoretical entities ...
...entities of two different theories theoretical entities of different theories in a ...
|
| 7 | base | 5 |
| Excerpts:
...target theory from the laws of the base theory plus some auxiliary premises so ...
...the entities of the target and the base theory the functional model of reduction ...
...entities referring to their causal relations to base entities the new wave model of ...
...which remains inside the vocabulary of the base theory one of the fundamental ...
...the process of deduction within the base theory without them one would not ...
|
| 8 | new | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...causal relations to base entities the new wave model of reduction deduces not the ...
...motivations of both the functional and the new wave model is to show that bridge ...
... the so called images of the new wave account cannot be constructed without ...
|
| 9 | causal | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...the functional model of reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of the target entities referring to ...
...of the target entities referring to their causal relations to base entities the new ...
...heterogeneous case do not have common causal relations so the functionalization of an ...
|
Marcel Weber: Philosophy of Experimental Biology
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Fri, 26 Jun 2009 06:15:58 GMT
Abstract:
Marcel Weber: Philosophy of Experimental Biology
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | biology | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... marcel weber philosophy of experimental biology ...
|
| 1 | experimental | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... marcel weber philosophy of experimental biology ...
|
| 2 | philosophy | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... marcel weber philosophy of experimental biology ...
|
| 3 | weber | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... marcel weber philosophy of experimental biology ...
|
| 4 | marcel | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... marcel weber philosophy of experimental biology ...
|
Predicativity and Structuralism in Dedekind's Construction of the Reals
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Tue, 09 Jun 2009 16:00:52 GMT
Abstract:
It is a commonly held view that Dedekind's construction of the real numbers is impredicative. This naturally raises the question
of whether this impredicativity is justified by some kind of Platonism about sets. But when we look more closely at Dedekind's
philosophical views, his ontology does not look Platonist at all. So how is his construction justified? There are two aspects
of the solution: one is to look more closely at his methodological views, and in particular, the places in which predicativity
restrictions ought to be applied; another is to take seriously his remarks about the reals as things created by the cuts,
instead of considering them to be the cuts themselves. This can lead us to make finer-grained distinctions about the extent
to which impredicative definitions are problematic, since we find that Dedekind's use of impredicative definitions in analysis
can be justified by his (non-Platonist) philosophical views.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | justified | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...question of whether this impredicativity is justified by some kind of platonism about sets ...
...all so how is his construction justified there are two aspects of ...
...impredicative definitions in analysis can be justified by his non platonist philosophical ...
|
| 1 | look | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...platonism about sets but when we look more closely at dedekind s philosophical ...
...philosophical views his ontology does not look platonist at all so how is ...
...of the solution one is to look more closely at his methodological views ...
|
| 2 | impredicative | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...s construction of the real numbers is impredicative this naturally raises the question ...
...distinctions about the extent to which impredicative definitions are problematic since we find ...
...we find that dedekind s use of impredicative definitions in analysis can be justified ...
|
| 3 | views | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...more closely at dedekind s philosophical views his ontology does not look platonist ...
...to look more closely at his methodological views and in particular the places ...
...by his non platonist philosophical views ...
|
| 4 | dedekind | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...it is a commonly held view that dedekind s construction of the real numbers is ...
...but when we look more closely at dedekind s philosophical views his ontology ...
...are problematic since we find that dedekind s use of impredicative definitions in analysis ...
|
| 5 | definitions | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...about the extent to which impredicative definitions are problematic since we find that ...
...find that dedekind s use of impredicative definitions in analysis can be justified by ...
|
| 6 | platonist | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...views his ontology does not look platonist at all so how is his ...
...can be justified by his non platonist philosophical views ...
|
| 7 | closely | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...sets but when we look more closely at dedekind s philosophical views ...
...solution one is to look more closely at his methodological views and in ...
|
| 8 | construction | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...a commonly held view that dedekind s construction of the real numbers is impredicative ...
...at all so how is his construction justified there are two aspects ...
|
| 9 | philosophical | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...look more closely at dedekind s philosophical views his ontology does not look ...
...justified by his non platonist philosophical views ...
|
Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Sat, 30 May 2009 08:25:31 GMT
Abstract:
It is a commonplace within philosophy that the ontology of institutions can be captured in terms of constitutive rules. What
exactly such rules are, however, is not well understood. They are usually contrasted to regulative rules: constitutive rules
(such as the rules of chess) make institutional actions possible, whereas regulative rules (such as the rules of etiquette)
pertain to actions that can be performed independently of such rules. Some, however, maintain that the distinction between
regulative and constitutive rules is merely a linguistic one. In this paper I present the status account of constitutive rules
in order to address this criticism. According to the status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses and
statuses are to be understood in terms of status rules. Status rules concern the enabling and constraining roles of institutions,
and constitutive rules specify the preconditions that have to be met in order for them to play these roles. Even though I
end up endorsing the claim that the distinction mentioned is a linguistic one, I go on to argue that there is an underlying
reality that constitutive rules serve to make apparent.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | rules | 15 |
| Excerpts:
...can be captured in terms of constitutive rules what exactly such rules are ...
...constitutive rules what exactly such rules are however is not well ...
... they are usually contrasted to regulative rules constitutive rules such as ...
...usually contrasted to regulative rules constitutive rules such as the rules of ...
...constitutive rules such as the rules of chess make institutional actions possible ...
...make institutional actions possible whereas regulative rules such as the rules of etiquette ...
...whereas regulative rules such as the rules of etiquette pertain to actions ...
...that can be performed independently of such rules some however maintain that ...
...the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is merely a linguistic one in ...
...i present the status account of constitutive rules in order to address this criticism ...
... according to the status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses and statuses ...
...to be understood in terms of status rules status rules concern the enabling and ...
...in terms of status rules status rules concern the enabling and constraining roles of ...
...roles of institutions and constitutive rules specify the preconditions that have to be ...
...is an underlying reality that constitutive rules serve to make apparent ...
|
| 1 | constitutive | 7 |
| Excerpts:
...institutions can be captured in terms of constitutive rules what exactly such rules ...
...are usually contrasted to regulative rules constitutive rules such as the rules ...
...that the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is merely a linguistic one ...
...paper i present the status account of constitutive rules in order to address this ...
...criticism according to the status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses and ...
...constraining roles of institutions and constitutive rules specify the preconditions that have to ...
...there is an underlying reality that constitutive rules serve to make apparent ...
|
| 2 | status | 4 |
| Excerpts:
... in this paper i present the status account of constitutive rules in order ...
...address this criticism according to the status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses ...
...are to be understood in terms of status rules status rules concern the enabling ...
...understood in terms of status rules status rules concern the enabling and constraining roles ...
|
| 3 | regulative | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...understood they are usually contrasted to regulative rules constitutive rules such ...
... make institutional actions possible whereas regulative rules such as the rules of ...
... maintain that the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is merely a linguistic ...
|
| 4 | pertain | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...as the rules of etiquette pertain to actions that can be performed independently ...
...according to the status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses and statuses are ...
|
| 5 | make | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...such as the rules of chess make institutional actions possible whereas regulative rules ...
... reality that constitutive rules serve to make apparent ...
|
| 6 | actions | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...the rules of chess make institutional actions possible whereas regulative rules such ...
...rules of etiquette pertain to actions that can be performed independently of such ...
|
| 7 | linguistic | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...regulative and constitutive rules is merely a linguistic one in this paper i present ...
...claim that the distinction mentioned is a linguistic one i go on to argue ...
|
| 8 | statuses | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses and statuses are to be understood ...
...rules pertain to institutional statuses and statuses are to be understood in terms of ...
|
| 9 | roles | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...status rules concern the enabling and constraining roles of institutions and constitutive rules ...
...in order for them to play these roles even though i end up ...
|
Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Sun, 17 May 2009 06:46:09 GMT
Abstract:
Michael Devitt has argued that a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that they
are derived from tacit knowledge of principles of grammar. Devitt's Modest Explanation is based on a controversial construal
of linguistic intuitions as meta-linguistic central-processor judgements. I will argue that there are non-judgemental responses
to linguistic strings, linguistic seemings, which are evidence for linguistic theories. Devitt cannot account for their epistemic
authority. This spoils his ˜modest explanation'. Devitt's opponent, the Voice of Competence View, is back in business.
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | linguistic | 6 |
| Excerpts:
...a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that they ...
...based on a controversial construal of linguistic intuitions as meta linguistic central processor judgements ...
...construal of linguistic intuitions as meta linguistic central processor judgements i will argue ...
...there are non judgemental responses to linguistic strings linguistic seemings which are ...
...judgemental responses to linguistic strings linguistic seemings which are evidence for linguistic ...
...linguistic seemings which are evidence for linguistic theories devitt cannot account for their ...
|
| 1 | devitt | 4 |
| Excerpts:
... michael devitt has argued that a satisfactory explanation of ...
...tacit knowledge of principles of grammar devitt s modest explanation is based on a ...
...which are evidence for linguistic theories devitt cannot account for their epistemic authority ...
...spoils his modest explanation devitt s opponent the voice of competence ...
|
| 2 | explanation | 3 |
| Excerpts:
...michael devitt has argued that a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need ...
...principles of grammar devitt s modest explanation is based on a controversial construal ...
...authority this spoils his modest explanation devitt s opponent the ...
|
| 3 | intuitions | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that they are ...
...on a controversial construal of linguistic intuitions as meta linguistic central processor judgements ...
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| 4 | modest | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...of principles of grammar devitt s modest explanation is based on a controversial construal ...
... authority this spoils his modest explanation devitt s opponent ...
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| 5 | authority | 2 |
| Excerpts:
...argued that a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that ...
...devitt cannot account for their epistemic authority this spoils his modest explanation ...
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| 6 | evidence | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...strings linguistic seemings which are evidence for linguistic theories devitt cannot account ...
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| 7 | seemings | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...responses to linguistic strings linguistic seemings which are evidence for linguistic theories ...
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| 8 | theories | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...seemings which are evidence for linguistic theories devitt cannot account for their epistemic ...
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| 9 | cannot | 1 |
| Excerpts:
...are evidence for linguistic theories devitt cannot account for their epistemic authority ...
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Editorial
- Author: Error: Author not contained in standard '<author>' tag in feed
- Publication date: Fri, 15 May 2009 06:11:55 GMT
Abstract:
Word Count:
| Rank | Word | Count |
| 0 | editorial | 1 |
| Excerpts:
... editorial ...
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